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resumo 
 
 
Uma das maiores mudanças que se verifica nos nossos dias é na área 
das transações financeiras, onde estão a ser feitos esforços para que 
os pagamentos em dinheiro sejam substituídos completamente por 
pagamentos através de meios eletrónicos. Há muitos benefícios 
esperados para essa etapa, mas poucas são as evidências relatadas, 
principalmente no que diz respeito às repercussões sobre a lavagem de 
dinheiro e o crescimento económico. Neste trabalho, tem-se como 
objetivo investigar a relação entre o aumento do dinheiro eletrónico em 
detrimento  da moeda fiduciária e a tendência de lavagem de dinheiro 
com uma análise geral subsequente do crescimento económico. Para 
compensar a quantidade limitada de dados que podem ser obtidos para 
um número diferente de países, será realizada uma análise composta 
por várias análises diferentes, examinando os efeitos da moeda 
eletrónica em alguns dos componentes da lavagem de dinheiro, 
garantindo, assim, a validade da análise. Os resultados obtidos 
confirmam algumas premissas anteriores, mas abrem caminho para 
novas questões, pois, se de alguma maneira, o dinheiro eletrónico está 
em desvantagem na lavagem de dinheiro, de outra forma, há novas 
oportunidades que também se abrem para potenciais criminosos. 
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abstract 
 
One of the biggest revolutions we are witnessing is in the field of 
financial transactions, where efforts are being made to bring payments 
to a completely electronic way. There are many benefits expected from 
this step, but few are the evidence reported, especially as regards the 
repercussions on Money Laundering and Economic Growth. In this 
work, I want to investigate a relationship between the increase in 
electronic money at the expense of paper money with the trend of 
money laundering with subsequent overall analysis in economic growth. 
To compensate for the limited amount of data that can be obtained for a 
different number of countries, and analysis composed of several 
different analyzes will be carried out, examining the effects of electronic 
money on some of the components of money laundering. This ensures 
the validity of the analysis. It will be seen that the results found will 
confirm some previous assumptions but will open the way to new issues 
since if in some ways electronic money is at a disadvantage of money 
laundering, in other ways, there are new opportunities that open up also 
for potential criminals. 
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1 Introduction 
Revolutions, in whatever field they occur, always involve other fields as well. The 
technological revolution of the 21st century marked a turning point in terms of production, 
efficiency, optimization of almost every type of human action, from logistics to distribution, and 
others. The economic-financial and monetary world has also been hugely influenced by this 
technological development, which tends to make everything electronic or digital. In fact, at the 
end of the twentieth century, cash began to step aside to gradually make room for money in the 
form of electronic cards before evolving into "virtual" coins, in 2009. As electronic money has 
acquired liquidity preferences, its uses have also been increasingly taken into consideration, 
trying to ensure that electronic money could perform almost all the functions of money 
including the historical performed property of liquidity. 
Therefore, the 2000s showed a strong attempt at change and a radical change in our 
system of transactions, concentrating, in most developed countries, the transition to an 
electronic way to manage all ordinary expenses, from the lowest to the most important (Bolt, 
Humphrey, Uittenbogaard, 2008). 
In a period, therefore, characterized by upheavals such as the creation of the Euro 
currency or occurrence of the economic crisis of 2008, illicit activities take advantage of it, thus 
feeding a market that sometimes it is not remembered to exist, but exists and its value is 
immense: the underground economy. 
In the Internet age, globalization and a world in which political balances are 
increasingly threatened, among other things, also by new terrorist organizations, therefore more 
attention is paid to the evolution of the economic reality that every day registers the movement 
of huge capitals from one side to the other of the globe. But the question arises: where do these 
capitals come from and where do they go? In addition to the regulated markets which are 
constantly monitored by the competent authorities, there are illegal "markets", that is, those 
uncontrolled ones in which sums of money from criminal activities are exchanged. Most of the 
illegal profits derived from the activities managed by the mafias such as drug dealing, 
exploitation of prostitution, exploitation of illegal immigration, management of gambling halls, 
creation of "ghost" enterprises and all those activities which by their nature constitute a crime 
(Naselli, 2017) 
Among the various reasons for the alleged shift towards an economy without cash, 
therefore, such as the ease and the most comfortable portfolio management, one of the most 
important is need to stop, or at least limit the as soon as possible, the illegal activity of money 
laundering, the main part and driving force behind the so-called "shadow economy". In short, 
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the goal is to fight the black market by eliminating its largest size, historically, liquidity. Several 
countries are mobilizing towards the abandonment of paper money. 
According to a report from the Copenhagen School of Economics, Sweden will be 
completely cashless in 2023 (Arvidsson & Hedman, 2017). By the way, this is only the last of 
the many steps that have characterized the evolution of money towards a total electronic version 
of that. Alongside it, other countries are trying to move towards a fully electronic transaction 
company, such as Denmark, Switzerland, and other countries have also made various attempts 
in this direction, such as China, India, also resorting to the new digital currencies that are 
developed in the world market in the last ten 10 years, like Bitcoin, which guarantees 
transactions with anonymity and without the need for an intermediary. 
As already mentioned, one hoped (and also expect) the effect of this step is the 
reduction of money laundering and the shadow economy. But somehow, there are reasons to 
believe that this transition does not have such a direct and strong impact or, better, it is not so 
immediate to think of a decrease in money laundering caused by the adoption of electronic 
money. Furthermore, it is not entirely certain that, from an economic point of view, a move to a 
cashless society has been beneficial. If therefore, this shift generates no benefits neither for 
money laundering nor for the economy, it could seem useless. 
In fact, from an economic point of view, it seems that some countries with less rigid 
financial rules have somehow gained advantages from money laundering (Patel & Takkar, 
2012), even if these advantages when they exist, should not be considered as a permanent 
benefit that is safe because they are often based on fictitious facts and economically non-solid 
outputs. Furthermore, from a functional point of view, it is essential to keep in mind, in fact, 
that in step with the times it is not only the "evident" world, because even crime knows how to 
exploit, often very well, the opportunities offered by technological development. 
According to these assumptions, therefore, the purpose of this work is to investigate 
the existence of an impact of cashless society on money laundering. However, the relationship 
may also be bilateral, thus being a correlation, but I aim to investigate the effect that moving to 
a cashless company has on money laundering. Subsequently, whether the impact is present or 
absent, the overall effect of this shift on the economy, in general, will be studied, also 
considering the alleged positive effect that money laundering could have had on the economy of 
some countries. The empirical part of the present master thesis is implemented using the 
GRETL econometric software. 
Through the implementation of this study, I want to find or, at least, to estimate an 
effect that the shift in cashless societies, that seems to be for some a certain future, has to the 
economy, focusing also in the effect on money laundering, supposing its influence on the 
economic growth. That’s a topic that seems to be not faced yet, while there are discussions 
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about the positive and negative effects of abandoning cash, without empirical analysis (that are, 
by the way, difficult because of the natural lack of data). 
Anyway, it’s not possible talking about outcomes on crime to be sure about those, 
because currently, the launderers are in a new age of money laundering, based already on 
technology: the so-called electronic money laundering or, better, transaction’s laundering. 
Criminals are already started to use that, indeed “Transaction Laundering for the online sales of 
products and services reaches over an estimated $200 billion a year in the US alone. Of this, $6 
billion involves illicit goods” (Teicher, 2018), and some electronic items for payments are 
already used as a means for money laundering.  "Indeed electronic payments systems would 
enhance their suitability for the whole money laundering process – prepaid cards for the 
placement phase, mobile payment system for the layering phase and virtual gold currencies for 
the integration phase (…) Money laundering is a complex and continuously changing process” 
(Woda, 2006:46) 
Through various approximations, it will be attempted an empirical analysis of the 
developments brought by the switch with electronic transactions on the economy and on the 
evolution of money laundering and so an estimation about the outcomes on economics will be 
done. Approximations are, by the way, necessary because the main feature of the “shadow 
economy”, is not regulated, is the lack of data that is, by the way, what keeps it alive; useless to 
say that a full availability of data regarding shadow economy and its effect on the economy 
would cause an immediate contrast on it and, hoping, its end. So, an electronic society has, as 
consequences, more transparency because of the traceability of transactions.  
Money laundering is a phenomenon affecting the economy from different points of 
view and with no good consequences. So, governments from all over the world need to fight it. 
Moreover, in different countries, a transition to a cashless society is aimed for the next 
years, and in general, the future seems to be without cash. I said already that One of the reasons 
for this choice is the advantages that seem to be for the fight against money laundering. But 
what does it mean a society without cash and which consequences could have on money 
laundering and to economic growth? Moreover, it seems that some countries developed, in the 
period of highest growth, also through some illicit activity of washing money. Shifting to a 
cashless society could have still a stronger impact on economic growth too. 
In this work, I will estimate the effect of this movement toward electronic transactions 
using data from the countries most oriented to this change and those that show already a high 
level of electronic transactions on economic growth and money laundering. Comparing these 
effects, I will analyze the convenience or less of this shift. 
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All of these will be discussed in the corpus of the thesis and it will constitute the main 
topic of it. In order to give an ordered and clear work, its steps are summarized here: 
After this Introduction, in chapter 2, a synthetic description of the main concepts 
studied under the present thesis. After, also an analysis of the contingent positive effect of this 
illegal activity on the economy is analyzed, considering previous papers, articles, and works that 
already collected and analyzed data. Some of the determinants of Money Laundering will be 
shown here and they will be really important for the analysis. The chapter will be completed 
with the evolution of the money laundering. are presented the eventual effects given by money 
laundering, I move to talk about some measures to prevent and face it, i.e. I move to talk about 
the move toward cashless society; presenting different points of view from different countries, I 
will try to collect the necessary information to justify the choice of data regarding electronic 
money. As said already, various authors and various organizations already informed about 
advantages given by this shift, like the traceability of transactions that should make it easier to 
catch launderers. But some problems arise, regarding the growth of the country due to the 
inability of the population to adapt such a big shift (UKessay,2018). After grounding the 
hypothesis, the methodology of the analysis will be presented and the data selected as well. 
Are analyzed, so, in the coming work, based on a literature review of, the effects of 
the development of cash in the last years, going through the cashless society. So, first are seen, 
in the next chapter, backgrounds about the effect of money laundering in the economy and the 
evolution of money laundering through the technological way. 
In chapter 3 it will be grounded the selection criteria of data, making first an overview 
of the countries that are more involved in the shift to a cashless society and the means to do that. 
So, the data selection will be made based on the literature review of chapter 2 and partially 3. 
The method, grounded in chapter 3, with the selection of data is implemented in 
chapter 4,  based on the hypothesis of the Multiple Indicator Multiple Causes Model (MIMIC) 
model, according to which, an unobservable variable can be estimated with those indicators 
seen as a determinant of that. In my work, using the Fixed Effect method for Panel data, a 
relation between the indicator considered as a determinant, and indicators regarding the 
incentives for e-money will be analyzed. Besides the theoretical ground, the determinants will 
be checked twice with the indicator for Money Laundering (ML) one directly, in estimation 
with ML as variable Y and the determinants as X variables and one indirect, checking if the 
effect of E-money on ML is coherent with the effect found for E-money to the determinants of 
ML. 
Then, in chapter 5, will be explained the results of the statistical analysis, through the 
use of the software GRETL, of the relation, if there is, first between electronic money and 
money laundering and after between electronic money and economic growth. Due to the limited 
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amount of data for this kind topic, the different analyses will be implemented, choosing each 
time a different dependent variable among the indicators chosen as a determinant of money 
laundering or shadow economy. Results are showed in the GRETL outcome, then synthesized in 
a table and explained. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Black economy: a cancer to economic growth? 
The underground economy has already been the object of several studies on literature. 
If it is true that now the shared thought is that this economy, with all the illegal activities that 
are part of it, among which the role of money laundering stands out, is damage to economic 
growth, some authors have studied and also found situations where states benefited from the 
presence of these illegal activities. On the other hand, a flow of money, legal or illegal, always 
involves an employer and a borrower, in a nutshell, the money that starts on one side ends on 
the other side. And while it is true that the shadow economy and money laundering damage 
market competition, the same goes for the role of individual states in international markets. It  
will be show later that, therefore, the countries located in different parts of the globe, Africa, the 
Middle East, America and Asia, and even Europe have favored or, if desired, exercised too 
weak control over this type of activity. In this way they have favored countries in those parts of 
the world, attracting foreign cash flows which were then rejected in sectors of other states such 
as construction and the entertainment sector, such as sports (Galullo & Mincuzzi, 2019). 
Advantages  for one country equate to disadvantages for other countries (Mincuzzi, 2016) 
But how can be defined Money Laundering and, after many years challenging this 
phenomenon, which are the consequences on economic growth and how to face this criminal 
phenomenon?  Money Laundering is defined as “Money laundering is a process conducted 
through the use of financial transactions to disguise the origins of large sums of money." 
(Seymour, 2008: 3), so the ability to show legality about a certain amount of money whose 
source breaks the law. More often, also, money laundering is directly linked with others among 
the most known economic frauds, such as tax evasion and corruption (Storm, 2013). This is 
because that often, the money "stolen" from the government and hide from fiscal control, need 
to be "washed", and more often this money is used as the bride to corrupt, sometimes also for 
who should "control" the spread of this phenomenon; this phenomenon of tax evasion usually 
involve different countries because the money, indeed, are often sent to foreign private banks of 
the so-called "tax haven" (Storm, 2013) 
Besides, there are also many markets located in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region that have found themselves subjected to significant restrictions and penalties 
for commercial and financial activities. 
Thus, the populations that, consequently, are excluded from the global market as they 
lack infrastructure and or other means of involvement, will meet their needs by making trade 
exchanges and commercial partnerships with other jurisdictions that have a different system of 
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imposing sanctions or those use currencies that are not traditional leaders in a cross-border 
settlement. It is in this way, therefore, that the black market, as well as the gray one, can emerge 
as reactions to these restrictions (Worldwide, Global Payments Report, 2020) 
2.2 How “hide” is the shadow economy? 
The underground economy is related to an unregulated economy totally different and 
disconnected from the licit economy. But the underground economy has enormous 
consequences on the open economy. Most of the more common sense sees the black economy 
having a negative influence on the licit economy, because of its effect on the natural 
development of competition, taxes, and the loss of jobs. Furthermore, the underground economy 
was estimated, with all limits, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with a value of 
approximately 3.6% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with 2.7% recycled1, given that 
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has estimated between 2 and 5% of world 
GDP, 800 billion - $ 2 trillion in the current United State of America (USA) dollars2.  
In figure 1, 2 and 3 is shown different features of shadow economy; in figure 1 is possible to see 
the size of the shadow economy in different European countries; in figure 2 the size of the 
shadow economy in countries that are developing and in already developed countries, showing a 
big difference between them; in figure 3 is shown the amount of shadow economy for European 
Union in terms of GDP. 
 
Figure 1: Size of shadow economy in European Union, 2016 (Source: IMF) 
                                                     
1
 https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ 
2
 https://www.unodc.org›unodc›money-laundering›globalization 
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Figure 2: Size of shadow economy for different countries 2000-2016 (Source: IMF) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 : Shadow economy and GDP per capita, 2016, (source: IMF) 
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2.3 How does money laundering work? 
There are many ways in which money is laundered, criminals all over the world take 
advantage of every possible opportunity to launder money obtained from illegal activities such 
as drug trafficking, illegal trafficking, in the worst case, but also tax evasion or financial fraud, 
with donations, bribes, participation in auctions, setting up in sports clubs, tenders and in 
various other ways (Galullo & Mincuzzi, 2019). Furthermore, with the advent of digitalization, 
which has allowed almost globalization, the opportunities for recycling have multiplied. 
However, essentially the money laundering process is divided into three phases, now also 
confirmed by the literature: the placement or immersion phase, the stratification phase, and the 
integration phase (Lombardi, 2018; Galullo & Mincuzzi, 2019).  
 11 
 
2.3.1 Placement or immersion phase  
Placement or immersion phase means. the phase in which the capital deriving from illegal 
activities is introduced into the market and automatically transformed into active balances 
through the help of financial institutions and intermediaries (Naselli, 2017), To do this, deposits, 
exchanges, purchases of financial instruments, or money transfer operations must be made in 
order to obtain "structural money" to obtain recognition of the relationship with the financial 
intermediary and local suspects (Sales, 2019). Due to the limits on money that can be managed 
established in some countries, to discourage illegal operations, the subjects involved in the 
placement phase implement a strategy called smurfing, which consists of diversification and it's 
clearly illustrated in Figure 4.  
In fact, this procedure allows you to move large sums simultaneously but without being 
reported. Indeed, payments are divided by opening a series of bank accounts at the same branch 
or multiple branches, to diversify the channels through which to achieve the gradual 
legitimization of the money. These transactions can be favored mainly by banks, financial 
intermediaries, traders, or professionals (Lombardi, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 4 : How Money Laundering Works (Source: Smurfing, Howstuffworks.com) 
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2.3.2 Layering stage 
The layering stage consists of the cancellation of any link between the recycled funds 
and the criminal activity from which they originate. This phase aims to prepare adequate 
coverage to legitimize the origin and membership of illegal resources. The processors, the so-
called laundrymen, carry out a number of different financial transactions, some to convert them 
into money and then invest it again in financial instruments, to make traceability more difficult. 
The aim is to obtain the maximum degree of qualitative and quantitative diversification of risk. 
Stratification operations are often sophisticated and complex in that they are performed in 
international fund transfers, corporate transactions in offshore countries, simulated transactions 
(Galullo & Mincuzzi., 2019). All these operations have the purpose of avoiding any 
investigation, so as to lose the documentary traces that can be traced back to the illegal origin of 
the funds (paper trace). This leads to the accumulation and overlap of real layers of 
documentation which make the correct reconstruction of movements more difficult (Naselli, 
2017). 
2.3.3 Integration stage 
This is the final phase, the money coming from criminal activities is completely 
integrated into the legal circuit to be "cleaned up" and reusable. Often are reused, for example, 
through investment in various sectors such as real estate, commercial, financial, entertainment, 
and industrial using forename. This is the most important to monitor because observing as 
through this it is possible to understand the great variety of techniques with which money is 
reinvested makes this phase the in-depth how the choices vary from one criminal association to 
another. Criminal structures act according to criteria of entrepreneurial rationality, directing 
capital towards reinvestment, which is at the same time a condition of development and survival 
of the so-called criminal economies. Failure to adequately monitor possible suspicious 
transactions in the vicinity of integration into the legal capital circuit undoubtedly implies the 
future impossibility of tracing the criminal origin of capital (Lombardi, 2018).  
All the process is illustrated in figure 5. 
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 Figure 5 : How Money Laundering Works – Stages, HowStuffWorks.com  
2.4 The problem of estimation and collecting data about shadow 
economics 
Concerning the estimations of data on the shadow economy, it is not possible to talk 
about the limits that arise. First of all, just the name “shadow” suggests that there are not so 
many clear data about it, otherwise it wouldn’t be “shadow”.  So, many times it is necessary to 
review or make approximations of what has to be observed because a lack of data or 
information can occur for this topic. Also, sometimes it’s possible to trust confident articles, 
works, and papers previously made.  
Anyway, as already said, the shadow economy has been estimated, with all the limits, 
by IMF with a value for around 3,6% of the world GDP, while previously the most update data 
estimated ML with a value in a range from 2 to 5% of world GDP  (UNODC, 2010). 
In the first months of 2020, an article by Repubblica.it (the main newspaper of Italy) 
(Occorsio, 2020) has estimated an increase of the value of this hidden economy that now should 
have doubled the value in ten years  
According to data gathered by The Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti-Money 
Laundering (ECOLEF) and reported by the European Parliament (2017), the United Kingdom is 
ranked first for laundering with 282 billion Euro, followed by France, Belgium, Germany, 
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Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Of the $7,8 trillion of global wealth offshore, Europe keeps 
$3 trillion, followed by Asia Pacific ($1,8 trillion) and, Middle East and Africa ($1,4 trillion) 
(Lombardi, 2018). In figure 6 are illustrated the determinants of Shadow Economy according to 
Kelmanson (2019). 
 
 
Figure 6 : Relations between shadow economy and its determinants(Source: Kelmanson et 
al., 2019: 9) 
Two main determinants can be used as a shadow economy, according to two authors 
(Perry, 2007; Oviedo 2009): (i) "exit" factors and (ii) "exclusion" factors (Kelmanson, 
Kirabaeva, Mircheva, Medina &Weiss, 2019). The so-called "exit" factors from the formal 
economy are all those factors that favor the emergence of voluntary informal employment. The 
so-called "shadow" workers generally have a similar (or even higher) gain than those obtained 
by workers of the formal economy; besides, shadow workers can enjoy greater flexibility at the 
employment level. 
Otherwise, on the other hand, the so-called "exclusion" factors from the formal 
economy can cause a detachment from formal employment favoring the informal one; in this 
case, the worker is "forced" to move towards this path of informality, when and why he is 
unable to find a formal job. The main difference between the two is given by whether the 
workers have more satisfaction in carrying out formal or informal work. In a large part of states, 
however, both groups of factors are present (Kelmanson et al., 2019). 
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Factors included in the exit ones are those that limited or, someway, obstacle the 
entrance on the world of work for people, so are in general those that regulate the job market, 
such as burdensome and costly regulation, like also high entry costs, trade barriers; high and 
complex taxation system; heavy bureaucracy, administrative barriers, corruption; etc, all 
features that bring low benefits of being formally employed or formally registered, show a low 
quality of public goods and services (infrastructure, social protection), influencing negatively 
the trust on the government so inducing the individual preference for self-employment 
(Kelmanson et al., 2019; Schneider, 2000). These indicators will be applied to the analysis 
implemented in chapter 3. 
For factors of exclusion, it’s meant those factors that make the individual, according to 
the standards of society and the will of the employer, not “enough” for a certain workplace. 
These factors can include, again, costly regulation, trade barriers, but also for the social 
demographic situation of the country, that sometimes limits opportunities for who is at the 
extreme of his career, like youngers and oldest, or some specific ethnic group; but low 
productivity can cause the exclusion of workers (Schneider, 2000). This is according to what is  
said by Kelmanson et al (2019:11) “Where an informal activity is driven more by “exclusion” 
factors, workers tend to rely on their jobs to provide their income subsistence. Those workers 
typically have fewer skills, less education, and are less productive.” 
In countries with a strong shadow economy presence, innovation and productivity are 
factors that suffer a lot. In this, the accumulation of human capital and entrepreneurial talent is 
not adequately valued (Kelmanson et al., 2019).  
According to Kelmanson et al (2019), there are various factors that are considered 
drivers of the developments of the dark economy, like for example a low quality of institutions, 
that have been found determinant (Kelmanson et al, 2019). An excessive regulatory burden 
moreover, or the inefficiency of government institutions, such as the weak rule of law and 
corruption can have negative effects on formal enterprises for hiring workers and can, therefore, 
encourage informal activities. It's in this view that regulatory burden has been always seen as 
the most robust cause of informality, because of its effect of suppression on entrepreneurial 
freedom, increasing costs, and bureaucracy issues (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein & Inchauste 2008). 
These indicators will be also considered for empirical analysis.  
The tax burden, as well as the tax administration, are other important factors in 
explaining and defining the size of the shadow economy. Indeed, it has been shown that in 
countries with a higher tax burden (and usually less monitoring and enforcement), there is also a 
greater incentive for tax evasion. (Schneider & Williams 2013; Hassan & Schneider 2016). 
According to Porta and Shleifer (2008) countries with higher productivity usually 
have a smaller informal sector because they do better the allocation of resources. 
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2.5 The effect of money laundering on the economy: previous opinions 
Money laundering consists in the replacement or transfer of money, goods, or other 
utilities deriving from criminal activities, or in carrying out other operations in relation to them 
in order to hinder the possibility of identifying their illicit origin Financial Action Task Force  
(FATF). If at a global size, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes estimates that dirty 
money moves between 3 and 5% of the planet's GDP, equal to a figure that fluctuates between 
600 and 1500 billion dollars3. In Italy, for example, according to Naselli in 2017, the laundering 
of illicit proceeds produced 410 million euros every day, 17 million per hour, 285 thousand 
euros per minute, 4750 euros per second; according to the author, it alone accounts for 22% of 
total Italian GDP (Naselli, 2017). 
Attacking illicit assets through seizure and confiscation has become of primary 
interest for most states, whose competent authorities conduct thousands of investigations every 
day to stop criminal flows. The theme of the seizure and confiscation of illicit assets, running 
along the dual track of prevention and criminal trial, identifies a double and significant moment 
of potential destabilization of the economic structure of criminal organizations. 
“Money laundering gives rise to a series of transnational criminal activities and has 
reached a level of globalization equal to that of the financial market, of which it uses the 
channels for the conservation and increase of the wealth of illicit origin..” Moreover, ".. Over 
the years, the techniques used in the integration phase have changed, both due to the need for 
diversification to divert the authorities, and because with the advent of information technology, 
it has been possible to cross over into cutting-edge sectors. It should be emphasized that the 
possibilities that today open up to the transfer of capital and therefore to recycling, are added 
to the traditional ones without replacing them." (Patel & Thakkar, 2012: 10). The difficulties, 
also in economic terms, have increased. 
Taking it into account, my purpose in this chapter is to show a different view of the 
shadow economy for the real economy, especially talking about the money laundering and the 
effects on the growth of some countries that gained “benefits” from it.  
This work, anyway, doesn't aim to give a "positive" view of money laundering and so 
it doesn't mean to justify in any way this particular negative behavior. Emerged, anyway, that 
some countries take advantage through this illicit mean, it simply wants to make sure that those 
positive relationships have existed and that some countries used in this way got illicit 
advantages, in terms of physic funds entering the country and so having consequences on it. 
                                                     
3
 https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ 
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So, in this chapter it will be discussed this topic defending it with the use of some 
previous researches; it will be a work based on secondary data analysis on previous works 
regarding that.  
The starting point of the present analysis is the negative impact, socio-economic, that 
money laundering has on society. That is what is shared by most scientists and what is natural to 
think. The natural game of the concurrence is damaged with illicit funds that can advantage 
some firms rather than others that are acting in a licit way (Fabris, 2019). But from a strictly 
economic perspective, money laundering has represented for some countries a source of funds, 
where other sources were not available. 
So, while on the one hand, the benefits seem an immediate consequence of the 
elimination of money laundering, on the other one cannot be sure that it will have "positive" 
effects in terms of GDP and development of a country. Nearly 5% of global "hidden" money 
GDP, according to the literature, should have a negative impact on growth. This negative impact 
from the competition consequences of money laundering is (and hopefully) supposed to be 
damaged by the move to electronic payments; without money, in fact, most criminal activities, 
such as drug trafficking and illegal trafficking among others, could slow down, since most of 
them are still paid in cash. This would damage the shadow economy, which will lead to an 
increase in public revenues, with the result of strengthening fiscal stability (Fabris, 2019). “Most 
shadow economy trading today includes unreported transactions that would otherwise be taxed. 
With the transition to a cashless company, these transactions would enter legal flows and be 
subject to taxation. This could lead to an increase in public revenues, with the domino effect of 
reducing the fiscal deficit and public debt. " (Fabris, 2019: 5). Furthermore, due to its direct link 
with the tax offense and corruption, positive consequences could also be found in these sectors. 
“The elimination of cash can seriously compromise criminal activity, especially those related to 
drugs and money laundering. These activities can hardly be done without cash. In addition, 
cash cannot be tracked, which is very useful for criminals. The move to cashless society could 
also make counterfeiting of money practically impossible, according to some previous authors " 
(Fabris, 2019: 5). 
2.5.1 Gulf countries case study 
But not all have the same opinion, indeed even if it is auspicated an improvement of 
the economy with defeating shadow economics and money laundering the past, the 
criminalization of money laundering and so acts against it has shown, also, a negative impact on 
real GDP, sometimes, with a slowdown, showing as some countries performed better with an 
amount of the economy made by washed money (Fakhri, 2016). The same authors, by the way, 
found opposite evidence for different countries of the same area, i.e. Gulf Countries, so that, 
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some countries of that area (Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia) saw, by criminalizing money 
laundering, a slow down to their growth and other (Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates) 
experienced an increase. 
The working paper was based on the hypothesis that the preventions have taken 
against illicit financing activities such as money laundering increase the prosperity and the 
economic growth of a country. 
“In the third case when the explained variable is suspicious transaction report we 
notice that this law (against money laundering) had negative effects on GDP meaning that in the 
past, GDP was, in part, constructed, even partially, by illicit money. So with the adoption of this 
law, the GDP decreases and a partial part of illicit money have changed destination" (Frakhri, 
2016: 18) 
That is the first example of the direct positive effect that money laundering has on the 
growth of some countries. Those are, anyway, all similar countries so other factors could 
influence this.  
Anyway, also middle-south American countries could have gained from a source of 
"dirty money"; but, also, there are some European countries that are known as tax heavens, such 
as Switzerland and Cyprus and they could have had benefits from those sources of foreign 
capitals in their banks, especially in Switzerland where the bank secrecy Law has always been 
favorable for the deposit of illicit money. (Ledyaeva, Karhunen, Whalley, 2013; Odysseos, 
1997; Hansen & Kessler, 2001) 
Also in the documentary known as "That Giant Beast that is Global Economy" 
transmitted by Amazon in its movies dedicated section, Prime Video, and made and directed by 
Penn Kal, American political and actor, it's talked about countries of South America that have 
been known as tax heaven for many years at the end of '90s and beginning of '00s, col. Among 
these, a country that had an important role was Panama. 
2.5.2 Panama case study 
Panama updated its banking law not long ago but first made money out of its illicit 
cash benefits. Speaking of the Panamanian economy, according to the analysis made on money 
laundering coming from KnowYourCountry.com, the economy of Panama which is based on 
the USA dollars is mainly based on a service sector, therefore a tertiary sector, well developed 
which it represents over 75% of GDP. These services include the operation of the Panama 
Canal, logistics, the banking sector, insurance, container ports, the flagship register, and the 
tourist sector, most of these services are also typical money-laundering channel, as of course the 
banking sector and major works such as the Panama Canal. Furthermore, the transport and 
logistics services sectors of Panama, together with infrastructure development projects, 
 19 
 
generally those in which dirty money is invested, have favored economic growth; despite this, 
the Panamanian public debt exceeded $ 32 billion in 2015, this due to the too much excessive 
public spending and public works projects (De Sanctis, 2017) 
Growth was supported by the Panama Canal expansion project which started in 2007 
at $ 5.3 billion - around 10-15% of current GDP. This project involved doubling the capacity of 
the canal, allowing it to accommodate ships too large to cross the previous canal. The United 
States and China are the main users of the Channel. In 2014, Panama completed a metro system 
in Panama City, valued at $ 1.2 billion. (De Sanctis, 2017) 
The strong economic performance, however, did not translate into widely shared 
prosperity Panama has one of the worst income distributions, the second worst in Latin 
America. About a quarter of the population lives in conditions of poverty; however, from 2006 
to 2012 poverty was reduced by 10 percentage points. Panama has, however, long been a center 
for money laundering in Latin America, serving criminal groups that inject dirty money into 
legitimate institutions, as well as corrupt elites who attempt to hide their wealth through the 
implementation of numerous offshore companies (Dittmar, 2018).  
In 2014, Panama was added to The Financial Action Task Force of Latin America 
GAFILAT's "gray list", which includes countries whose efforts to combat money laundering are 
not considered sufficient. In 2015, the Panamanian government pledged to take steps to be 
removed from the list and lose its reputation as a hotspot for dirty money. To this end, laws 
have been created to supervise and control banking activities and to better report suspicious 
monetary assets. The government has also incorporated several recommendations proposed by 
GAFILAT at the moment (Dittmar, 2018). 
Panama was removed from the list in 2016, but scandals such as the "Panama Papers", 
which revealed a huge number of offshore companies headquartered in Panama, revealed that 
the country still had a long way to go in the fight against money laundering.  
There has however been some progress made by the authorities in recent years, but 
despite this, the fight against money laundering continues to be a difficult task for Panama. This 
has to do, in part, with the economic model of Panama, by the way. Indeed, the same factors 
that contributed to economic growth have been investment incentives such as pending financial 
regulations that allow for high levels of investment, but, at the same time, also make it easier for 
criminal groups to hide the source of their illegal revenue (Dittmar, 2018; Esoimeme, 2016). 
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Figure 7 : Panama: Growth Accounting (growth contributions, in percentage points); 
(source: IMF, 2018) 
In figure 7 is shown the growth contributions for different factors of production. In 
each period the growth given by labour is always of the one given by capital. Since 2013, 
anyway, Panama showed progressive acts to adequate to the Anti-Money Laundering rules. By 
the way, some countries showed clear benefits from the decrease of the shadow economy: 
2.5.3 Nigeria case study 
How money laundering has impacted the Nigerian economy is different. money 
launderers are here to import all the necessary mass products like medicines, cars, etc. In this 
way, it is easier to hide the illicit nature of their finances, but at the same time, since these goods 
are imported at low cost because they are marketed only to recover illicit funds, the sale price of 
these imported goods is equally low, with evident damage to local production, which must 
devalue its products to resist competition from foreign goods (Ikpang, 2011). In addition, 
another practice used was the typical creation of businesses and companies to mask the 
recyclers' activities. However, like any other offshore company, these companies are not 
incentivized to create profits, since the first objective is the washing of dirty money, creating 
another damage for the country's economy (Arowosaiye, 2015). According to Ibrahim, in the 
1980s and 1990s, the period of Nigeria with the highest presence of money laundering, 
household manufacturing industries had suffered severe price losses and huge investment losses 
resulting from huge inventories of unsold products due to lack of patronage and consumer 
preferences for imported goods, thus leading to the collapse of most local industries resulting in 
a dramatic increase in unemployment and redundancy of the workforce (Arowosaiye, 2015). 
Also, as already mentioned, the shadow economy is related to money laundering, 
obviously also contributing to economic damage. In particular, money laundering and tax 
evasion are very close. The principle of taxes is to redistribute wealth in favor of social equity. 
By not receiving the proceeds from taxes, or by receiving less of it, the government is failing to 
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do so. Money laundering encourages tax evasion as money launderers will try in every way to 
hide finances to steal them from the taxman; this phenomenon involves not only professional 
criminals but also legitimate workers (Amahalu, Abiahu, Okika & Obi, 2016). 
2.5.4 New Challenges 
New technologies have undoubtedly accelerated the times of movements not only of 
goods but also of capital, services, and financial resources. This context has automatically led to 
the spread of new financial instruments, new and increasingly "processed" payments (IT), 
investments, and regulation of commercial and financial transaction techniques. This process is 
called "financialization of the economy" and, unfortunately, it offers the same advantages to 
both legal and illegal economic operators. Indeed, the globalization of the economy and the use 
of the Internet as a fast-medium of transmission have created a network of markets without 
spatial boundaries, on the one hand, but on the other, they have also made the fight against 
international money laundering more tortuous. Some are the risks associated with the 
elimination of internal and external borders between different markets, which must be identified 
in the ease with which capital can be moved from countries with strong regulation to others with 
a more latent and flexible regulatory system such as the so-called tax havens or offshore centers. 
The possibility of using innovative financial instruments and the availability of 
sophisticated technologies for the transmission of information and orders allow criminals to act 
with great speed, to stratify multiple acts of transformation and transfer, to operate remotely in 
different squares, to hide the identity of the actors and the actual ownership of the assets. The 
sectors in which criminal organizations invest range from the financial sector, to drug 
trafficking, to smuggling and counterfeiting, to being reused in investment transactions in large 
contracts, in hotels and restaurants, in the creation of "ghost" companies, in the large-scale 
distribution and purchase of properties, including sports clubs (Naselli, 2017).This is going to 
increase the already high cost of fighting money laundering. 
2.6 The cost of fighting money laundering 
According to Charles Kenny, an economist fellow at the Center for Global 
Development “Global regulations on money laundering are expensive to enforce and unfair to 
poor countries. They don't work very well, either” (Kenny, 2015:1) 
According to him, at best, the global Anti-Money Laundering ( AML) system “snares 
just a fraction of 1 percent of criminal income flows”. The real money laundering convictions in 
all regions of the world do not involve more than a few hundred million dollars. In addition, in 
the USA, less than 0.2% of all recycled materials could be seized with AML's activities.  
 22 
 
But AML attempts still cost a lot of money: about $ 7 billion a year is generally spent 
only in the United States to implement the implementation of AML regulations according to the 
criteria of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
Moving on to smaller countries, however, the cost becomes disproportionately higher. 
Mauritius, for example, has 1.3 million people and 25 government officials in charge of 
implementing the AML - more than the number of opticians - excluding the work done by 
banking staff to investigate unsafe customers. 
Furthermore, due to the rules of the FATF, the possibility for Somali citizens living in 
the USA to send money home in an attempt to hinder the financing of terrorist activities has 
ceased. Indeed, this funding was very substantial, even in the order of hundreds of millions of 
dollars, but, according to economist Kenny, this cut caused unease to the Somali economy as 
the funding was mostly invested in public expenditure such as education, health, sustainable 
development, and others (Kenny, 2015). 
In Europe, a survey was conducted according to which respondents had a strong 
perspective on whether AML compliance generated a net positive or negative impact on the 
productivity of their business line. Most companies (74%) incredibly believe that the impact is 
negative, particularly in France and Germany, where respondents showed more pessimism (79% 
and 76% respectively) (LexisNexis, Survey Report, 2017). 
The figures down it’s showed the impact of AML on the economy, its features, and its 
outcomes in the different economic areas. In figure 8 is shown the impact of AML on a line of 
Business productivity, in figure 9 for compliance department, in figure 10 is shown the annual 
loss of productivity due to job satisfaction and in figure 11 is shown the annual loss in 
productivity due to AML compliance by Country. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 : Impact of AML Compliance on Line of Business Productivity (The True Cost of 
Anti-Money Laundering Compliance, 2017, Source: LexisNexis.com) 
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Figure 9 : Job Satisfaction Concerns in Compliance Departments (The True Cost Of Anti-
Money Laundering Compliance, 2017 LexisNexis.com) 
 
 
 
Figure 10 : Annual Loss in AML Compliance Productivity Due to Job Satisfaction Issues 
(The True Cost Of Anti-Money Laundering Compliance, 2017 LexisNexis.com) 
 
 
 
Figure 11 : Annual Loss in productivity due to AML compliance by Country (The True 
Cost of Anti-Money Laundering Compliance, 2017 LexisNexis.com) 
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2.7 Fighting money laundering leaving physic cash? 
Money laundering is a problem afflicting all societies and economies in the world 
since those are based on interests. It is spread in almost all economic groups, from the private to 
the small enterprise to the large ones.  
This happens because too much often, in a society where the affirmation in a market 
where competitiveness is the guideline, washing money represents an over source of money, 
quite easy and concerning in big amounts. In this way, the enterprise, institution, or whatever, 
can "show" huge revenues and in this way can decrease prices, gaining a competitive advantage. 
But since criminal funds started to be washed, the governments of different countries 
tried to find items and laws to contrast the phenomenon. This resulted in a cycle characterized 
by the fight between money launderers and anti-money launderers, so with new techniques to 
wash cash followed by new techniques to fight the criminal activity. One of the last steps had 
been the limit on cash transaction imposed by some countries, but in this way money launderers 
started to take a "digital" direction, starting to use the virtual world with internet and the 
electronic payments and data to pursue their activity, taking advantage from two of the biggest 
innovations of the economy and especially related with the money: the electronic payment and 
the digital currencies. 
There are governments, however, that try to encourage a transition to digital methods 
because, as already mentioned, the latter is seen as a way to discourage and undermine money 
laundering and tax evasion, even if they are seen as useful. innovations to promote competition 
in financial services. There are, however, for some, other improvements brought about by 
digital payments as well as those regarding money laundering; in fact, these are seen as useful 
tools to protect consumers from theft or loss of money, as well as saving them the hassle and 
commitment of always carrying a wallet with them (Cerulus & Contiguglia, 2018). 
Furthermore, even an analysis made by comparing twenty-seven European Union 
countries with each other revealed a significant negative correlation between the use of 
electronic money and the size of the shadow economy (Lombardi 2018) 
Schneider and Buehn (2012) have made internationally comparable data available for 
the size of the grey economy and above all reveal that the lowest grey economy share is from 
the USA, which has 9.1% of official GDP and while Canada, France, and Germany have the 
highest share, with around 15%. So, a little evidence was found for a correlation between the 
estimated amount of the shadow economy and the spread of cash for payments countries 
(Lombardi, 2018), 
But it will appear, further, that, so, the physical cash, even if it's still the favorite item 
for the launderers, it's not the only one. 
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As it was said already, different solutions were proposed for each of the new forms of 
money laundering, but the one that seems to be the most fixable nowadays, concerning the age 
we are living in, is the shift to a cashless society, dominated by electronic digital payment 
transactions. Right now, it's almost shared from the most and already supposed by the various 
previous authors (Ricci, 2016; Fabris, 2019) that a total shift to electronic payment can decrease 
the money laundering such as various financial and economic crimes, and indeed, this is one of 
the main reasons about the shift in electronic payments transaction, such as using of credit or 
debit card, contact or contactless, e-transfer, but also cryptocurrency. This shift could help to 
fight against Money Laundering and the economic fraud because of the possibility to fully track 
all the transactions, so having the information about the source, mean, and kind of business. 
As talked already, in the past the criminalization of money laundering and so acts 
against it harmed economic growth showed, showing as some countries performed better with 
an amount of the economy made by washed money. 
In the next part, it will be moved to talk about this measure that represents, right now, 
the last step of the attempts to contrast money laundering, i.e. the cashless society, about which 
various authors and various organizations already informed about advantages given by this 
shift; for example, the traceability of transactions that should make easier to catch launderers. 
But some problems arise, regarding the growth of the country due to the inability of the 
population to adapt such a big shift (Ukessay2018; The Economist, 2018) 
Besides those, it seems younger citizens and more developed countries were more 
inclined to use those electronic payments, who the debit card, who credit, who transfer.  
According to the survey conducted from the “Survey on payment methods, 2017” 
(Swiss National Bank, 2017), in Switzerland, anyway, taking as sample 2000 interviewed 
citizens, it was noticed as the expectation for the future is still using cash, with a kind of 
“intolerance”, sometimes, for alternative methods, considered often slower than cash payments, 
costlier and not always available.  
Anyway, Switzerland has always been one of the Tax Heaven where money 
launderers send their illicit money to stay safe.  
In 2018, anyway, the Swiss banking secrecy, the rule of not sharing information about 
banks’ clients, started to decline and now the Swiss Government agreed to share all the 
information about its clients; it could have two meanings, i.e. the decrease of flows of illegal 
money toward the country and an idea to shift toward a cashless society. 
Another survey was conducted worldwide (Capgemini, World Payments Report, 
2019), and it was shown as more people were tented to use cash rather than electronic payments, 
giving also some motivation. Again, the new generations showed as more available to use 
electronic digital payments, considering the cash as an obsolete payment instrument.  
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It has already been studied that a big European country such as Italy, representing the 
3rd economy of EU but also the highest tax evasion and corruption rate, would have clearly 
more benefits than costs from a shift to a cashless society regarding the effects on underground 
economics (Lombardi, 2018.). In the present work,  this correlation for countries more or less 
similar to Italy will be investigated  
2.8 The Evolution of Money Laundering toward an electronic era 
The official start date of the legal fight against money laundering is 1970 when the 
Bank Secrecy Act was issued. It was from this law that financial institutions were required to 
record all major cash transactions and report to the government, therefore, any suspicious taxes. 
Subsequently, to mitigate the criminal activity, several laws in the following decades followed 
to make it more difficult to accumulate and hide funds deemed illegal (Metzer, 1991). 
But then the era of the Internet and online commerce peeked out, making it possible to 
achieve a certain level of anonymity only by hiding behind the screen of a computer or tablet, 
smartphone, or any electronic device. 
And from this, a new category of online crime born and started to take advantage of 
the digital payments industry in order to facilitate washing money. So, regulators, who 
previously had devoted enormous resources to build complex, and mostly manual, AML 
processes, now simply can't keep up in this digital age. It is in these circumstances that money 
laundering, so, became Transaction Laundering. 
2.9  Is Transaction Laundering the new way of Money Laundering? 
By Transaction Laundering. it’s meant the natural, digital evolution of money 
laundering. This phenomenon is now one of the most difficult challenges that the anti-money 
laundering regime (AML) has to face nowadays. The laundering of transactions occurs in a very 
simple case, that is when an undisclosed company uses the payment credentials of an authorized 
merchant to process payments for another shop, also not disclosed, which sells unknown 
products and services. (EverCompliant, Transaction Laundering is the New, Advanced Form of 
Money Laundering, 2018; Houben & Snyers, 2018). 
For example, a cybercriminal can create a website in just a few minutes and, by 
approving payment by card and using a legitimate business account such as an online book 
store, can mask his income from illegal activities. Online anonymity is what makes this 
recycling possible. (Silver, 2013; Cyber Security Intelligence, Cyber Criminals Have Ingenious 
Money Laundering Methods, 2018). 
However, by increasing the volume of Internet commerce, the risk of spreading this 
crime would increase. So how big could this transaction laundering be? 
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Research conducted by Finextra has highlighted a share of money laundered by 
laundering transactions, of over $ 200 billion in the US only, and only for the sale of products 
and services online. $ 6 billion of this 200 is proceeds from illicit assets. (Teicher, 2018) 
This is a system that uses legitimate online payment systems, carrying out, however, 
hidden e-commerce transactions through completely legitimate merchant accounts. In this way, 
many legal websites serve only as a means of payment for all those criminal companies that sell 
firearms, illicit drugs, child pornography, and other illegal goods online. 
A problem that is arising, so, strictly related to Transaction Laundering is the 
increasing of Money Mule. Money Mule is all those people that money launderers use to 
recycle their money, through the use of an illicit website, or channel on Telegram, or page on 
Social Network for selling illicit stuff. Mostly, they aren’t aware to make another illicit over the 
one they are already doing acquiring an illegal product (Europol, Money Mule, 2019) 
However, there are not only regulatory offenses; in addition to these, in fact, the 
laundering of transactions violates the policies on credit card brands, thus placing merchants 
and buyers in a position of violation of the requirements Know Your Customer (KYC), also 
violating many other federal regulations, with consequent possible fines and legal actions 
(Teicher, 2019). 
2.9.1 How does Transaction Laundering Works? 
Recyclers, in order to process transactions from everywhere, use a store merchant 
account that. This allows fraudulent merchants to channel unauthorized transactions avoiding 
the detection of the same payment processors, as well as obviously by the authorities (Yantis, 
Attia & Lethorius, 2018) 
Considering the number of people involved in online payment, the possible 
combinations with which the deception can take place are many. 
It is easy enough for scammers to be able to start hosting companies where the sites 
and credit card companies with which their payments are made in minutes. (Teicher, 2018) 
The scam, as mentioned before, works in this way: A criminal creates an illegal site 
where shoppers can buy the drugs, firearms, or other illicit goods they want. Most of the times, 
anyway, the shoppers do not even know they are committing a crime (Yantis et al., 2018) 
At the moment they have to pay, they submit their credit card credentials, but not in 
the drug site, that doesn't take care of the payment, but rather by a legitimate, for example, 
looking site that pretends to sell a legitimate product, like books  
The credit card is so charged, and the seller collects his/her payment via the legit site. 
Thus, a customer who is going to buy marijuana will have the payment for a book as "Da Vinci 
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Code" (just to mention one) and in this way, the transaction will show up on the credit card 
statement issued by their bank (Europol, 2019) 
2.9.2 Where transaction laundering is  
Increasing the technology in all sector of the legal economy, it wouldn't increase also 
in the sectors of the illegal economy that developed also other channels to recycle money and 
the most popular are: 
 
1. E-Commerce 
E-commerce can allow to wash illicit money through a legal payment processor. For 
example, in 2017 there was a suspicion of transferring dirty money from ISIS to the USA 
through the sale of computers on eBay by a member of the Islamic State. The payment of the 
transactions arrives from abroad to the creator of the transactions through a PayPal account 
(Integrity Indonesia, Cyber-laundering, the new face of money laundering in the digital age, 
2018). 
Some managers have also taken advantage of the services offered by a famous rental 
app, Airbnb, to launder dirty money by taking advantage of the help of rented homeowners 
(hosts). The proponents, so, act in this way, book a room from the host and make the payment 
using a credit card. Subsequently, the host will return the money, obviously under payment4. 
 
 
2. Digital currency 
Digital currency (or cryptocurrency) represents a new, unconventional, and more 
complicated method to launder money, but at the same time, it gives the offenders a higher 
degree of privacy, managing to better obscure the source of the money (Houben & Snyers, 
2018). 
How the authors put dirty money into the cryptocurrency system are essentially two. 
Both ways provide for the exchange of fiat money (irreversible currency) with cryptocurrency 
in a digital exchange (CoinBase, Bitstamp, Kraken, etc.) through a bank account or using a 
Bitcoin debit or credit card debit card. The tendency to exchange in digital is preferred to the 
other since Bitcoin ATMs usually implement money laundering. (Integrity Indonesia, 2018) 
The main cryptocurrencies are usually bought (Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Litecoin). 
Unfortunately, the main currency implements a blockchain system; this is used to store the 
traces of control of transactions and to obscure them and obtain confidentiality, therefore, a 
                                                     
4
 http://community.withairbnb.com/ 
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series of" stratifications "is performed. Thus, the currency stored in cryptocurrency will be, in a 
second moment, redeemed in fiat form to your liking of place and time (Pertiwi, 2018: 10). 
 
3. Online games 
Pure online games can also be used as a way to launder money. a few years ago, Sony 
Online Entertainment managed to discover a money-laundering system implemented by one of 
his users, who, through the purchase of rare and precious objects in games, was able to transfer 
large amounts of money from an account in the United States to that in Russia (Integrity 
Indonesia, 2018). 
 
4. Crowdfunding 
These sites are accessible to everyone, easy to use, and still do not have anti-fraud and 
anti-money laundering systems, making it a very attractive place for criminals who need to 
wash money. 
A typical example can be that of creating a fake campaign and donating to the 
campaign and then collecting them. The bank will therefore probably read and register the 
payment as legal as it occurred through a legitimate crow funding site (Integrity Indonesia 
2018).  
2.10 Evolution through E-Commerce 
Thanks to the evolution that e-commerce and mobile payments have had, money 
laundering has been able to reach unprecedented levels too. According to EverCompliant, at the 
end of 2016, there were 352 billion dollars recycled globally through the use of e-commerce, of 
which 11 billion dollars related to the sale of illegal goods online. 
The laundering of transactions is now increasing dangerously, due to the ease of 
onboarding of an online merchant and the creation of a florid payment environment for 
companies. In this way, the installation process of a company with a real business can be 
skipped, going directly to the creation of an accessible and fast website online. 
Furthermore, the anonymity of the transaction laundering allows to carry out the three 
phases of money laundering (placement, stratification, integration) without leaving any trace. 
The target of the criminal is therefore achieved faster and with less difficulty, on a large scale, 
than it would have been achieved with the traditional method, that is, by using cash. 
(EverCompliant, 2018; Teicher, 2018) 
Through the creation of networks of interconnected online entities, it becomes easy to 
make the transaction and its true source disconnected, therefore, criminals are thus able to 
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circumvent controls and anti-money laundering measures. The tracing of illegal activities by 
law enforcement and regulatory bodies thus becomes difficult. (EverCompliant, 2018; The 
Paypers, Payment Methods Report, 2018; Teicher, 2018) 
Furthermore, very importantly, e-commerce has now reached an unlimited and global 
level. KnowYourCustomer (KYC) requirements are minimal for onboarding merchants. In this 
way, the conduct of illegal financial activities is made feasible by platforms of this kind. 
(Teicher, 2018) 
Furthermore, even if you do not have a bank account, you can be present in the trade, 
especially in the online one. "It was estimated that in 2018, Mexico, despite having a 61% non-
banked population, was second in e-commerce growth, showing a 59% increase in a year". 
(Walker, 2018). 
Anyway, the shift to electronic methods it's not only made by the consumer because 
there are also Business Companies that are moving away from cash; "more businesses than ever 
before are becoming cashless". Airlines and British Airways are two examples of businesses 
that no longer accept cash for onboard purchases (Walker, 2018). 
Moreover, for retailers, decreasing the use of cash would also mean decreasing the 
chances of facing a robbery; therefore, payments from an electronic device or made online 
represent a safer system. Besides, to prevent customers from paying cash, some retailers offer 
online loyalty programs with offers that are acceptable only via email or online on the website. 
Either way, it's important to consider that money leaves no trace, so "when it's gone 
it's gone". But credit and debit card transactions can be easily traced or deleted. Therefore, 
consumers who use electronic payments or the like, such as debit or credit cards, are protected 
by the Fair Credit Billing Act, which protects these instruments while for cash there isn’t any 
protection scheme and this could bring to the abandon of cash (Bradley, 2018).  
Bank payments and their popularity are based primarily on the trust that consumers 
have in their bank. By using this method, the consumer has several advantages by being able to 
make cheaper payments, especially in the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, where bank 
payments "offer a frictionless payment experience, especially on mobile devices"; faster, and 
making payments faster, going from hours to minutes or even seconds, there are advantages for 
both the merchant and the seller; cheaper for the merchant (The Paypers, 2019; Khiaonarong & 
Humphrey, 2019).  
Furthermore, the popularity that online bank payments are gaining, especially among 
the merchants that operate online in Europe, can be proven by the fact that, according to data 
that was provided by a Trustly report, most Europeans (i.e. 68% of Spanish citizens, 66% of 
Italians, 61% of French citizens, 55% of Germans, 55% of Dutch citizens and finally 51% of 
Swedes) would have no problem making purchases from foreign websites, if there were no need 
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to enter credit or debit card information and thus disclose it to foreign and unknown merchants. 
People would, therefore feel more likely to make purchases on sites belonging to a foreign 
jurisdiction if only online banking were also accepted to pay (in Spain the 59% such as in Italy, 
in Netherland the 55% of inhabitants, 47% of French people, 44% of Germans citizens and the 
35% of Swedes), always according to the report mentioned above, as it guarantees a risk of 
fraud almost absent compared to that deriving from credit card payments. (The Paypers, 2019). 
The information collected in this chapter, together with the information related to data 
of the next chapter, is determinant for the choice of the variables/indicators for the analysis of 
the next chapter. 
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3 Through the new era of electronic transactions: The 
evolution of money  
3.1 Grounding the method 
The first part of this chapter is based on the explanation of the choice of data. So, an 
overview of the evolution of the money, the use of cash now, and the electronic payment 
systems more used is necessary to understand the selection criteria. 
3.1.1 Through the new era of electronic transactions: The evolution of 
money is the evolution of society 
“The evolution of modern money will also help us to understand some important 
nuances about the role of government and technology that will prove useful in analyzing the 
scope for alternative currency systems in the future” (Rogoff, 2016, p. 15). 
Since the money in its physical way was invented, i.e. in Lydia, it has always 
acquitted the function of certainty of value and medium for transactions. For Westerns, anyway, 
history starts thanks to Marco Polo’s discoveries about paper money in China. 
 And paper money has always had a crucial role in the developments of history, for 
example, II WW could have not started without the hyperinflation caused by the huge amount 
of circulating cash. But also, history if paper money is very interlinked with the development of 
technology and society. But what is important of the money is that it is, totally, not static. The 
first commodities used as currency were slowly replaced by metal coinage, coins were partially 
replaced by paper notes and they could be replaced by electronic currencies, as parts are already 
been (Rogoff, 2016). 
And indeed, right now, according to UKessay (2018:1), “we are currently seeing the 
gradual abolition of cash". In the last decade, the physical money is, however, slowing down its 
growth in a clear way, indeed the trend now seems to be a now unstoppable decline. In the last 
10 years alone, the amount of cash in circulation has decreased by about 30% and the value of 
payments by cash has also shown decreases in the order of 10% per year (Jenkins, 2018). 
Anyway, some authors illustrated how between 2012 and 2015, there was an increase 
in non-cash alternatives used for payments. In those three years, non-cash payment methods 
have increased year on year by just over 5% and just over 3% in value (Mercadante, 2018). 
What led to their diffusion is mainly given by the efficiency, the ease with which they make 
payments possible, and the fact that these are much more flexible (Bolt et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, in 2016, almost 50% of total payments involved the use of liquid money. 
(Davis, 2016; Khiaonarong & Humphrey, 2019). Despite the amount of money in circulation, 
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therefore, it is always quite high considering the hypothesized drop in cash, compared to 2007 
this figure shows a decrease of 22% when 69% of all transactions were conducted by cash 
(Davis, 2016). Comparing, therefore, the various statistics, both current and those of past years, 
highlight the constant decline of cash and the continuous change of the economic attitudes. In 
some countries, moreover, it’s witnessed an even faster decline than others as regards the use of 
cash; in the United Kingdom, for example, although the demand for physical liquidity from the 
financial crisis continues to increase, in the period of one year between 2015 and 2016, the 
number of all cash payments has declined sharply, greater than 10%, and consequently, the 
value of these payments also fell by 5%, reaching the value of £ 240 billion (The Paypers, 
2019). 
The world is so slowly moving toward electronics infrastructure through transactions 
that can be made. It’s their feature of frictionless and their speed that make e-payments 
advantageous on cash, and this is why they’re spreading a lot in some countries such as in 
China, where in the past 5 years Alipay has issued $96 billion in loans, but 1billion $ of 
business was also caught by Amazon between 2017 and 2018 (Bradley, 2018). Moreover, the 
reachability is one of the best advantageous, because smartphones become the wallet of choice 
that currently accounts for around 60% of all payments.  Digital wallets are more convenient.  
Large success seems to be gained by digital wallet because their usage is increasing all 
over the world. A typical example is the spread of PayPal and Apple Pay, increasingly popular 
apps that now dominate the online shopping websites, with the possibility to complete 
transactions with a “click” (Bradley, 2018).  
According to the Payment Methods Report by The Paypers (2019), anyway, the total 
decline of cards for payments (credit cards such as debit, prepaid, and all the other types) is still 
far, indeed their usage is expected to increase over the next four years. According to Global 
Payments Report by Worldpay, payment cards are still the most spread and used payment 
method for the eCommerce in 2018, with a 37% share of all the purchases (The Paypers, 2019). 
Additionally, while there were more than 6 billion cards in 2018, payment cards operating on a 
global basis were expected to reach nearly 12 billion by 2023 (with around 8 billion debit 
cards). If, of course, much more moderate growth is expected in already mature markets, where 
the use of the payment card has already almost become a normal means of payment, as regards 
emerging markets, payment cards should grow much more decisively with also the support of 
digital wallets. In 2018, the value of the global card issuance market is estimated at 45 trillion 
dollars (Ukessay, 2018). In figure 12, indeed, it’s showed the change in the spread of payment 
methods from 2018 to what is forecasted in 2022.  
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Figure 12 : Global share of point of sale payment methods 2018-2022, (source: 
MerchantSavvy, 2020: 1) 
“Bank transfers, debit cards, credit cards, e-wallets, and mobile wallets, are now the top 
payment methods used to process the 122 billion digital transactions made each year. 
Customers are paying less and less with cash, and it is slowly but coming to an object of the 
past. In fact, PPRO research has found that more than a quarter (26%) of consumers now find 
it irritating when they are forced to pay by cash rather than by card.” (Black, 2019: 1)  
3.2 Overview on countries payment methods 
Credit and debit cards are still preferred, globally, in western markets, i.e. those of 
developed countries, such as the USA and Europe, especially as regards E-commerce. As 
already mentioned above, the spread of payment cards in developing economies is supported by 
the use of digital wallets. For example, some systems make it easier for a consumer to connect 
their card to their e-wallet account, such as Unified Payments Interface (UPI)  in India, a 
payment interface used for this purpose. 
Payment cards dominate the European and US markets, holding in both almost half 
(Europe) or more than half (USA) of the total share (Global Payments: Transformation and 
Convergence, 2020). 
All world banks hope to stop the production and spread of the currency. In Ireland, 
this process has already started with the blocking of 1 and 2 cent coins as a means of payment. 
South Korea also appears to be following the same path as Sweden, attempting to eliminate all 
currencies in the coming years (Jenkins, 2018). 
3.2.1 USA 
In the USA, the shares of payment methods for the e-commerce sector are divided as 
follows: credit cards are used by 34% of the payers, while the others are detached enough since 
the electronic wallet has a 20% share, debit cards by 19%, debit cards deferred by 13%, then 
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ending up with the others who are used by less than 10% of the payers, such as bank transfer 
(6%), cash on delivery (4%), the prepaid card (3%), and finally other less widespread methods 
such as PrePay, used only in 1% of payments as well as all the other unimportant ones. The 
payment methods that use the POS, on the other hand, are much more unbalanced towards the 
payment through cards, with the credit card exceeding 40% and the debit ones reaching almost 
35%. Cash represents only 16% of payments, while other methods such as debit card, e-wallet, 
and prepaid card do not reach 5% each (Worldpay, Global Payment Report, 2018) 
For the next years for this market, until 2023, Worldpay assesses the drop in the use of 
cash at the POS for around 5% (Worldpay, 2018) mainly by migrating to electronic wallets. The 
company plans to double its use of the electronic wallet by 2022. In the USA, awareness of 
digital payment methods, for example, electronic wallets, is growing steadily, including the 
most popular ones that can be used in stores in December, i.e. 2017 were Apple Pay and PayPal. 
So, almost 300 million people had an account PayPal worldwide in the first quarter of 2019 and, 
in December 2018, more than 35% of retailers in all USA had already started to accept payment 
through PayPal; a further 34% were added in 24 months (Constantinescu, 2019). Figure 13 
illustrates the development forecasted until 2022 for payment methods in the USA, such as 
figure 12 did generally. 
 
 
Figure 13 : US Point of safe payment methods as % of total Forecast 2018-2022 (Source: 
MerchantSavvy, 2020:1)  
3.2.2 Europe 
Online banking payments across Europe are one of the main growing payment 
methods, getting the maximum boost due to the combined effect of Payment Service Direct 2 
(PSD2) and Single Euro Payments Area  (SEPA) Instant Credit Transfers. In some markets, 
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the innovation for digital authentication methods has begun to take on increasing importance in 
favoring the popularity of online banks, such as the simultaneous transition to customer-to-
business and business-to-customer payments, like Tikkie in the Netherlands and Mobile Pay in 
the Nordic countries ( The Paypers, 2019). 
According to Worldpay’s Global Payments Report 2018, in Europe, there are different 
online banking ePayments systems, and in the next years, the use of credit and debit cards will 
be overtaken, globally, by the spread of this different payment method. Furthermore, according 
to Ovum, instant payments, with a value of about 340 billion euros for Europe, will become one 
of the principal online payment instruments. (Worldpay, 2018) 
In November 2019, the European Central Bank (ECB) published data showing that the 
percentage of payments made through the use of card machines is continuing to accelerate 
across Europe, showing also regular use of mobile banking by 84% of Europeans. Another 
study dated 2019, from Mastercard's Digital Banking, reveals how important this method has 
become for most Europeans, confirming the ECB study specifying that mobile banking from 
traditional banks is worth 63% of the total while another 21% of the total value comes from 
digital-only banks (Visa, 2017; Schachinger & Linsser, 2017; Eurosystem database) 
Anyway, 27.7 Billion is the amount of digital transactions in 2018 in the United 
Kingdom  (UK), the highest in Europe, making the British country the biggest cashless spender 
in that year, followed by France (23.5bn) and Germany (22.7bn) (Merchant Savy, Amazing 
Stats Demonstrating The Unstoppable Rise of Mobile Payments Globally, 2020). 
3.2.3 Sweden  
“Sweden heads the vanguard”, keeping the words pronounced by Financial Times 
reporter Patrick Jenkins (2018). Sweden is already progressing towards a cashless society and 
it’s the country that is doing it most. In Sweden, in recent years there have been important 
developments in the adoption of mobile and electronic payment systems, with more than 90% of 
the population that can access to online banking apps, such as Swish for example, and on 
average each person carries out more than 270 card transactions each year (Segendorf & 
Wretman, 2015). As a result, the demand for liquidity in Sweden has decreased, such as the 
demand for liquidity as a present value reserve, and the demand for liquidity for transactional 
purposes. In 2015, liquidity represented only 1.5% of Swedish GDP (Sivabalan, 2017), down 
from 4% in the early 2000s (Ukessay, 2018).  
In 2015 Sweden made a lot of investment in IT so that it ranked third out of 148 
countries in the use of ICT systems (Segendorf & Wretman, 2015). This, added to the adoption 
of specific and certified cash registers, Sweden has given a significant boost to the reduction of 
VAT evasion. As a result of this action, there has been the closure of bank branches and ATMs 
 38 
 
and the possibility for the Government to introduce negative interest rates. According to 
Jenkins, a cashless society is imaginable in the northern country and in his opinion Riksbank 
will finish printing notes since 2030 (Jenkins, 2018)  
3.2.4 United Kingdom 
Payments made via mobile phone and contactless payments in the UK are very 
popular, as it appears that the state is preparing to become a cashless company. Physical money 
is rapidly becoming an excess in today's society, increasingly connected to the online world 
with a third (33%) of the United Kingdom claiming to no longer use cash. In fact, ATMs have 
been less used, with 44% of people using it less and less (Clarke, 2018) 
In 2016, the volume of contactless payments in the UK was £ 26 billion (Clarke, 
2018); Compared to the present value, cash transactions could decrease by 26% by 2025 
(Clarke, 2018). 
The United Kingdom is rapidly moving into the new era of cashless payments. The 
forecast is that the next five years will be crucial for the proper development of cashless 
payments by effectively taking control of them. (Walker, 2019) 
The payment card infrastructure is not yet well developed in some growing economies 
of APAC, LATAM, and Africa, where also a high share of the population is unbanked. As a 
result, some African countries have developed alternative payment systems. 
Kenya and South Africa figure prominently as examples of markets where the journey 
from cash to “cashless” is progressing. Kenya launched already M-Pesa, a platform that 
manages online payments in the country for almost all services, and it’s possible to be used with 
a smartphone. In South Africa, the central bank of the country (South African Reserve Bank - 
SARB) approached to the payment ecosystem stems showing an understanding of the critical 
role and impact of regulatory regimes on the payments space from a global vision (Worldpay, 
2020) 
3.2.5 Asia and Pacific 
In 2017, the global volume of digital commerce registered an increase; This increase is 
also expected to go on in all areas of the world. The Asia-Pacific area weighs more than half of 
global digital commerce, thanks mainly to the fast growth of the Chinese market and is heading 
towards a digital era just as quickly (Bech et al., 2018). 
The Chinese market has been penetrated by digital wallets (for example Alipay) and 
these will remain in strong growth until 2022. In 2017 the additional contribution of digital 
wallets added about 40 billion to global payments revenues (Bech et al., 2018). 
Moreover, in China was conducted a study according to that it was estimated that 
more than 50% of the Chinese population use cashless payments; a typical example is Alibaba 
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(Alipay); electronic payments were from this share of population for more than 80% of 
transactions, that totally represent 60% of China's total payments (Jenkins, 2018). China will 
probably be the next country to follow a path similar to the Swedish one towards a cashless 
society, also thanks to the rapid technological growth of the region. In China, consumers can 
purchase products and services only using phone numbers, QR codes, and the latest 
development, facial recognition (Bech et al., 2018). 
China and India are driving the expansion of e-commerce, but, due to the weak 
penetration of debit and credit cards, it is difficult for merchants to enter these markets. Debit 
cards in India are still the favorite and most used method for online shoppers to pay, from a 
report by Financial Software and Systems (FSS), which is one of the biggest and most important 
Indian payment processors.  
India recently attempted to limit the use of cash, demising the highest value note, i.e. 
500 and 1000 Rupiah, but the results were negative for the economy and useless to emerge 
underground economy (Timpone, 2018) 
In Singapore, credit and debit cards take still the biggest share of the online payments 
with more of the 50% of these transactions that involve cards; in the country of Philippines, is 
the cash, still, the most popular mean of exchange. (Merchant Savvy, Amazing Stats 
Demonstrating The Unstoppable Rise of Mobile Payments Globally 2020;). Figure 14 illustrates 
the development forecasted until 2022 for payment methods in Asia, such as figure 12 did 
generally. 
 
Figure 14 : Asia Pacific Point of Sale Payment Methods forecast, 2018-2022, (Source: 
MerchantSavvy, 2020:1) 
With an overview of payment methods in different parts of the world, it’s possible to 
talk about relations between the payment methods of countries with their risk (or effectiveness) 
of money laundering. 
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3.3 Size of the Shadow Economy and impacts on cash on circulation 
After the overview of the evolution and diffusion of money and electronic money, 
what is important is to define the size of the shadow economy, which has been found, in 
previous chapters, to impact the use of cash from ordinary daily payments and overtime. 
Furthermore, a comparison between twenty-seven countries of the European Union has already 
been mentioned and that reveals a significant inverse relation between the size of the shadow 
economy and the usage of electronic payments and the information provided by Schneider and 
Buehn (2012) and reveal that the United States has the lowest grey economy share of the grey 
economy with more than 9% of official GDP and Canada, Germany and France have the biggest 
share, with around 15%. In other words, a little evidence for a correlation between the size of 
the shadow economy and the use of cash for payments was found  Lombardi, 2018). 
 Moreover, according to Di Cocco Frederick, Head of Sales and Relationship 
Management in Bank of New York Mellon, paradoxically, in some markets there are regulators 
that create conditions for driving transactions out of the banking sector; this is a curious fact as 
this is the sector in which, at present, the activity is better regulated and controlled. Current 
approaches risk therefore to reduce the amount of not licit transactions in banks, but at the same 
time there is a risk of over-regulation, which could lead to transactions out of "control" and 
reduce the total effectiveness of regulation and application (Capgemini, 2020) 
So, among the different benefits that a cashless society could lead to, i.e reduction of 
the cost of cash, emersion of the underground economy, an increase of the consuming cycle, the 
security of transactions, stimulation of consumption, the aim of this chapter is now to focus on 
the emersion of the underground economy, the consequences and the ways to challenge it, to 
better understand the analysis left for the next chapter.  
As said already, the shadow economy in Italy accounts for 21% of the GDP, the only 
one of the "Big-5" in Europe higher than 19%. 
It has been stated already, taking Italy to the European average for e-payments could 
mean recover almost 70 billion and thus reduce the missing VAT (IVA) revenues. As already 
said, a higher spread of cash is usually highly correlated with a higher degree of the 
underground economy. According to different research works, an increase in the number of 
electronic transaction by 10% for at least 4 consecutive years will reduce the underground 
economy by 5% (Lombardi, 2018). 
According to Per Bolund, Swedish deputy finance minister, the transition from cash 
was excellent for tax revenues (Jenkins, 2018). Furthermore, according to Jenkins, a question 
for many economists is why the increase in circulating cash compared to GDP is evidently due 
to crime and tax evasion.  
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According to Sands, however, drug trafficking is one of the main, if not the main, 
engine of illegal financial flows (Jenkins, 2018; Ukessay, 2018). Getting rid of money seems to 
make it easier for governments to fight tax evasion, a global problem especially in the USA and 
Europe where the total amount of money laundered, exceeds $1 trillion dollars each year 
(Summers, 2016). In 2011 alone, 19% of the total income that had to be reported in the United 
States, instead was not (Zorpette, 2012). Moreover, in Ireland, it is estimated that there are 200 
euros of the unpaid tax for every 100 paid (Ukessay, 2018) 
Tax evasion, like money laundering, however, is strictly linked to human trafficking 
and drug trade; the employment of illegal immigrants is a typical problem arising from the 
availability of liquidity. Around the world, illegal workers estimated are 230 million (Rogoff, 
2016), occupied mostly in the construction sector and the agriculture one (the so-called "cash 
jobs"). These incomes are difficult to estimate because of the liquidity. The number of illegal 
immigrants working, for example, in the USA would decrease strongly if cash would be 
eliminated, such as would the drug trade, the human trafficking and other several activities of 
the black economy; in general, the overall amount of money to be washed would decline; this 
will be the topic tested in the analysis of chapter 3 and 4.  
 
 
Figure 15 : Size of Shadow Economy in European Countries, 2016, (Source: IMF) 
In figure 15 is represented the size of Shadow Economy in 2016 in European 
countries, while in figures 16 and 17 are represented the sectors (and so, the determinants) of the 
shadow economy, where it spreads and where it is paid more. 
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Figure 16 : The Shadow Economy of the five focus countries, divided by sector, (Source: 
Schneider, 2016) 
 
Figure 17 : Sector where electronic payments can pay off, (Source: Schneider, 2016) 
 
 
As it’s possible to see, in general countries directed toward a cashless society are 
characterized by a low underground economy, corruption, besides some exceptions.  
So it can be suggested a kind of negative relationship between money 
laundering/shadow economy and amount of cash, as a high rate of the underground economy 
slow down the movement toward a cashless society. This can be suggested also by the normal 
and natural preference of criminals and money laundering for physical cash, not traceable and 
so anonymous. 
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3.4 The current use of “cash” 
Liquidity as a means of payment is used to carry out transactions involving goods and 
services. In this way, cash is tied to the experience of the consumer. Hence, physical liquidity 
remains crucial in cost management (Dubey & Berghout, 2016). However, there is no 
unanimously preferred payment method, as everyone has their preferences, thus causing an 
increase in payment methods; for example, bank transfers via the Internet or payments focused 
on consumer tastes through Fintech companies may be mentioned. However, according to some 
economists, the increase in such digital transactions does not come as a consequence of the 
abandonment of physical currency, however, many individual traders prefer to use cash (Dubey 
& Berghout, 2016; Khiaonarong & Humphrey, 2019).   
According to some authors, therefore, in addition to the payment cards already 
mentioned regarding the emergence of electronic wallets, even the money does not seem 
destined to run out soon (Fish & Whymark, 2015). Despite the talks of a cashless society and 
the deterioration in the use of liquidity for transactions, the demand for physical liquidity is 
increasing, especially with the decrease in the opportunity cost (Bech et al., 2018) and also the 
total value of the banknotes and coins in circulation. This demand for liquidity has grown since 
the latest global financial crisis. Despite the talk about a company that does not use cash for 
transactions, the actual demand for liquidity is continuously increasing in most countries (Bech 
et al., 2018), and with it, the total effective value also of liquidity in circulation; this increase 
began especially since the end of the last economic crisis. 
It has been estimated that the value of the banknotes and coins circulating in the 
English economy in 2018 was around £80 billion (Clarke, 2018), and almost the same situation 
in Australia, with $73 billion in circulation (Davis et al. , 2016). According to Jenkins, there are 
trillions of paper cash and coins in the economy nowadays (Jenkins, 2018), so it seems easy to 
guess that the probability that cash will die in the near future is unlikely. In fact, cash is still 
important for consumers, with physical money currently representing almost 10% of total global 
GDP (Jenkins, 2018). Indeed "money is printed freedom" (Campbell, 2018) and therefore 
should remain in the economy for the future (Jenkins, 2018), but still, according to the Global 
Payment Report 2020, things don't seem to be exactly like that. 
3.4.1 The technologic evolution of cash 
In June 2018, the amount of debit cards reached almost one billion in India alone, of 
which about 20 million issued for new holders (Bansal, Bruno, Denecker, Goparaju, 
Niederkorn, 2018) 
From October 2018 to January 2019, there was a withdrawal of 67 million debit cards 
ordered by the (Reserve Bank of India) RBI to replace them, as old and with the magnetic 
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stripe, with the new cards Europay, Mastercard and Visa (EMV), safer because it is based on a 
chip. However, there have been other government initiatives to encourage the use of Visa and 
Mastercard cards, for example, Smart Cities Mission, i.e. a smart city project. And so, in the last 
month of 2018, more than 20 million contactless cards were issued by Visa. In addition, in May 
2019, thanks to a partnership between Paytm Payments Bank and Visa, the latter has launched 
its debit cards that now, in India, are able to compete with UPI (Unified Payments Interface) 
payments in terms of use. 
This “UPI is an instant real-time payment system developed by National Payments 
Corporation of India aimed to facilitate inter-bank transactions” (The Paypers, 2019: 1). 
The USA tap and go payments took so much to spread to the North American country, 
where large-scale implementation occurred in 2019, allowing card-issuing banks to acquire 
market share. In 2017, payments from US consumers reached more than 6 trillion $ in all cards, 
which is 8% more than in 2016. Given the complex composition of the market (a multitude of 
banks and merchants and a very fragmented payment sector, data breach), issuers have started to 
issue chip cards, which are more difficult to counterfeit (Păstrăvanu, 2020). When there are 
terminals that accept chip cards, the cards need only be updated to complete the change in 
contactless. However, this delay in chip cards leaves the United States behind in contactless 
cards. Fortunately, in November 2018, card issuer JP Morgan Chase announced that all of its 
cardholder customers will be transferred contactless by the end of 2019. Additionally, according 
to Visa, 100 million contactless cards have been started to be issued in the United States since 
the end of 2019. Another new feature is the Rewards credit cards. These multiplied so that their 
use was facilitated especially in developed economies, offering hundreds of dollars in prizes, 
cashback, points (Păstrăvanu, 2020; Visa, annual report 2019, 2019).   
Transactions should always be fast, so there are always innovations and improvements 
in technology, especially in the mobile payment space. Evolving, digital payments led to the 
birth of e-wallets. In World Payments Report 2018 by the Capgemini, approximately 41.8 
billion non-cash transactions made via e-wallet globally, of which a value of around 71% (or 
29.7 billion) was conducted through the payment app and electronic wallets, services offered by 
Big Tech for those who are customers. This payment method has proliferated due to smartphone 
penetration, increased mobile payments, consumer behavioral changes, and regulation. 
Furthermore, the combination chosen between frictionless payments (based on customer 
experience), security, and the added value obtained using the service and innovation around 
these portfolios seems to be successful. Therefore, several reasons make these tools destined for 
popularity, as they are easy to integrate on multiple devices, they can often be used on all 
channels, they are user-friendly, they encourage loyalty and marketing programs - and all sorts 
of new ideas regarding payments (eg Apple Card connected to Apple Pay). The three most 
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important global e-wallets are PayPal, WeChat Pay and Apple Pay (Capgemini, World Payment 
Report, 2018) 
Besides cards, also in Europe another method that is spreading its usage is MobilePay, 
started by different banks in different countries: Danske Bank in Denmark, DNB's Vipps in 
Norway, and Swedish bank in Sweden. Among a population of almost 30 million in all Nordic 
countries, Swish has acquired 13 million users. So, MobilePay has been estimated with more 
than 4 million users in Denmark (almost 70% of the population), 800,000 Finnish users (15% of 
the population), and almost 7 million in Sweden (around 67% of the population), while around 3 
million are users of the app Vipps in Norway (57% of the population). The success gained by 
the Nordic electronic wallets has sparked international interest. While Sweden-based Swish 
appears to focus primarily on its domestic market, Denmark-based MobilePay and Norway-
based Vipp aim to an international spread (The Paypers, 2019). In addition to MobilePay, in 
Nordic countries there are also, of course, global brands such as Apple Pay, Google Pay, and 
Samsung Pay, but also there are local initiatives, like Paylib and Lyf Pay (France), Pingit (the 
United Kingdom),  Payconiq (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands), Vipps (Norway), Swish 
(Sweden), Payback (Germany), and OK (Netherlands). In addition, by partnering with retail 
chain stores, local electronic wallets can offer added value to customers (eg OK in collaboration 
with Dutch retailers; Lyf Pay has partnered with Carrefour) (Capgemini, 2018). 
Latin American (LATAM) countries, on the other hand, has three main types of e-
wallets: contactless mobile wallets such as Apple Pay, e-commerce wallets such as Visa 
Checkout or Amazon Cash and wallets with stored value; these allow users to "top up" their 
mobile money accounts for mobile phones. PayPal has been very successful in these countries 
thanks to its security and its additional services (eg. Free return shipping) which allow the use of 
the wallet for a wider environment in electronic commerce, in LATAM. 
In North America, as already mentioned, the pace of progress towards contemporary 
technologies such as electronic wallets are mitigated by mature technological infrastructures, a 
consolidated and therefore extremely scalable economic and technological sector, and with 
widespread habits and preferences, established and installed during the course of generations. 
The typical user of mobile payment methods is more than 30 years old with training already 
acquired in a different technological period. Indeed, according to the Statista report on the use 
of mobile payments in the United States, in 2018 only 15.4% of mobile payments customers 
used electronic wallets designated as PayPal or Google Pay (Bansal et al., 2018) 
Another method that is slowly taking the scene is Instant Payment. Instant payments 
help online bank payments grow to become a payment method widespread throughout Europe. 
With cross-border transactions, this method can also be more beneficial for merchants. Even in 
the United States, as an alternative to credit cards, this method is catching on. PayWithMyBank 
 46 
 
is one of the best known ACH payment providers in the USA. The ability to pay, through this 
method, or to be paid is easily done by logging into your online bank account without leaving 
the merchant's site or app. In June 2019, PayWithMyBank merged with Trustly and together 
they manage to have a transatlantic coverage of online bank payments. Both companies give 
possibilities to merchants around the world to accept payments implemented through online 
banks from the USA and European consumers.  
This merger meets the needs of merchants that are searching for a different method to 
cards by accepting online payments also directly from consumers' bank accounts. Another 
instantaneous system was developed in India and is the already mentioned Unified Payments 
Interface (UPI), i.e. a real-time payment system developed by the National Payments 
Corporation of India (def. by Wikipedia). The role of the Reserve Bank of India is to directly 
regulate the interface; when it is needed, it can instantly make a transfer between two bank 
accounts only on a mobile platform. Additionally, in January 2019, the volume of transactions 
through the UCI exceeded that of credit and debit card transactions, according to the National 
Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) and Reserve Bank of India (RBI), even if not so much 
(The Paypers 2019; Capgemini, 2020; Hasan, Antifaman & Ali, 2020) 
The digitalization of the economy is starting, so, to have its consequence; in the past 
few years, many banks around the globe have been closed; in Ireland alone, each month 60 
branches were closing since 2015. Anyway, according to economist Andy Haldane, the decline 
of cash will bring to the bank’s new flexibility in the case of another downturn (Giles, 2015). 
Anyway, the digitalization of the economy has brought developments in both, legal 
and illegal economy. Criminals, indeed, also managed to adapt to the opportunities given by the 
new technologies. The new development of money laundering, in particular, takes the name of 
“Transaction Laundering”. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 A mixed approach model as a starting point 
Given the nature of the topic, statistical analysis can be difficult. Indeed, as already 
said, a lack of data is always a potential problem of analysis like that. In order to fill this gap, 
several methods have been employed to measure the size of the shadow economy: 
1) There are direct work-based approaches with surveys, tax control, and other compliance 
methods. These methods give the possibility to get information on the structure of the 
shadow economy. However, the information collected may not be representative and can 
be inconsistent for different states.  
2) Then, there are indirect approaches that include the analysis not using single indicators but 
relations among them, for example, there can be the difference between public expenditure 
and the income, or the discrepancy between GDP growth and electricity consumption 
growth, or even between the actual amount of currency circulating in the economy and the 
amount of that requested from the population. However, these measures logically also 
involve other underlying assumptions (elasticity, the velocity of money, the base year of 
the estimation, etc).  
3) A third model is based on the foundations of the Multiple Indicator, Multiple Causes 
(MIMIC) model, launched by Frey and Week-Hannemann (1984) and then expanded by 
Schneider (Explaining the Shadow Economy in Europe: Size, Causes, and Policy Options, 
IMF working paper, 2019). This is the method I am going to use, as already said even if it 
will be adapted for the topic.  
So, the method implemented in this thesis is based on a direct approach with the 
collected data from a lot of the most important databases of the web, but the choice of data to 
collect is based on the hypothesis of the Multiple Causes Model. Indeed, “Multiple Indicators, 
Multiple Causes Models (MIMIC) are often employed by researchers studying the effects of an 
unobservable latent variable on a set of outcomes, when causes of the latent variable are 
observed” (Tekwe, Carter, Cullings & Carrol, 2014: 1). 
Schneider as well illustrated the use of this model for measuring shadow economy 
“Statistical models that use statistical tools to estimate the shadow economy as an 
“unobserved” or “latent” variable; e.g. the MIMIC (Multiple Indicator, Multiple Causes) 
Method” (Schneider, 2019:9). 
So, the direct approach will be based on the hypothesis that when one variable is 
unobservable, multiple effects of its observable determinants are done. This direct approach 
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consists of the analysis of each of the determinants of the unobservable indicator (Money 
Laundering) chosen, with the use of those variables whose I wanted to study the effect on ML, 
which are variables related to the spread of electronic money and limits on cash. 
After, the analysis will be, so, implemented different times, each time choosing a 
different dependent variable among the indicators chosen as the determinant of money 
laundering or shadow economy. The method is based, as above, on the hypothesis of the 
MIMIC model, according to which, an unobservable variable can be estimated with those 
indicators seen as a determinant of that. In my work, using the Fixed Effect method for Panel 
data, a relation between the indicator considered as a determinant, and indicators regarding the 
incentives for e-money will be analyzed. Besides the theoretical ground that gives validity to the 
choice of variables, the determinants will be checked twice with the indicator for "ML", one 
directly, in estimation with ML as variable Y and the determinants as X variables, and one 
indirect, through an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis, checking if the effect of E-money 
on ML is coherent with the effect found for E-money to the determinants of ML. These 
estimations, singularly, don't have too much significance because of the few amounts of data 
directly referred to money laundering, but together, as "check" of the other regression they can 
get validity. 
 
What are, so, the main causes that can determine the size of the shadow economy and 
of tax evasion? Different authors found different determinants; according to Schneider (2019), 
for example, some of the determinant factors, with the expected signs, are: 
• Federal system (-) 
• Consistence of regulations (+);  
• Income (-);  
• Public Sector Services (-);  
• Quality of public institutions (-);  
• Self-employment (+);  
• Size of the primary sector (+);  
• Tax and social security contributions charges; (+) 
• Tax morale (-);  
• Unemployment (+);  
Anyway, the correlation that there is between the size of the shadow economy and 
productivity is endogenous, with causation going both ways (Kelmanson, 2019) 
For my analysis that is related to both the shadow economy and money laundering but 
more with the second, an addition of variables is needed.  
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Indeed, as far as my method is concerned, it must be considered, as already repeated, 
that data of this type are not easily found since they are scarcely shared. The major databases 
struggle to present these data, which, even when there are, can be scarce. Because of this, some 
more approximated variables are considered, variables that are determinant in sizing shadow 
economy and Money Laundering. In my case, in addition to the data strictly related to money 
laundering, it is useful to use the data obtained regarding terrorism, corruption, trafficking, etc. 
This data is very connected to the issue of money laundering, as its source and destination 
because, as explained before, those phenomena are linked. In the next paragraph will be 
explained the choice of these indicators as other determinants. 
All this, therefore, if on the side it can be useful to fill in those gaps that could not 
have been fixed otherwise, on the other it implies a huge work of database analysis, analysis of 
the data available to choose, among those, those that are better prepared for the intended 
purpose. Therefore, found in useful datasets, among them it is necessary to take the indicators 
that I am really interested in observing. 
In this way, data on different countries were collected according to a choice criterion 
based on the states mentioned in the historical review and, especially, that they had belonged to 
the European Union, even if states from other geographical areas were also included: in this way 
I want to give a wider overview of the study and I also want to capture as many cultural aspects 
of every part of the world as possible, which could influence citizens' behavior. 
To choose other variables, it makes sense to remind some literature review already 
mentioned. Subsequently, the data were grouped and sorted in a database done independently 
with excel. In this database, there are basically panel data, i.e. time series data combined with 
cross-over data. 
4.2 Grounding for the approximation of the data 
According to some authors, the approximations used to implement this analysis seems 
to be adequate. Indeed, also Schneider set that for estimating money laundering or shadow 
economics there wasn't an ideal or dominating method – all have serious problems and 
weaknesses, that is a good idea, when possible, to use several methods and, especially, it is 
necessary to do a lot more research regarding the estimation methodology to be used and 
regarding the empirical results for different countries and periods (Schneider, 2019). 
Moreover, a ground of this estimations comes from the assumption that the 
underground economy uses cash to avoid tax burden and for illegal purposes, as according to 
Lombardi, so as regressors variables stating the preference for liquidity are used such as interest 
rate on deposits and level of the tax burden. Moreover, another aspect of the underground 
economy which relates more directly with the share of total crimes is coming from prostitution 
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and drug dealing, which is possible, so, to use it as a variable for shadow economy/money 
laundering (Lombardi, 2018; Barone, Delle Side & Masciandaro, 2017).  
Tax evasion, such as money laundering, however, it is strongly connected, as already 
seen, to human trafficking and drug trade; the problem of the employment illegal immigrants in 
the agriculture and construction sectors, especially, derives from the availability of money. 
Illegal immigrant workers worldwide are around 230 million (Rogoff, 2016).  
Moreover, “migration and remittances play a dual role with respect to the shadow 
economy. Migrant workers, similarly to informal workers, tend to reside in rural areas, have 
less education, and are employed more in labor-intensive (less productive) activities compared 
to workers in the formal sector. The shadow economy and migration also play a similar 
poverty-reducing role, providing a safety net for the poor. As a result, the two phenomena can 
be viewed as substitute activities, and are therefore negatively related". (Kelmanson et al., 
2019: 9) Moreover, remittances and refugees can foster informality by giving capital or a safety 
net, pushing recipients of economic remittances to choose a job that is informal and, logically, 
less secure (Ivlevs, 2016). As an example, it happens in Moldova where women and young 
people, with family members that work in foreign countries, choose the informality rather than 
the formal way to work (Kelmanson et al., 2019). 
Therefore, migration and informality can be considered as substitutes between them 
also because, moreover, this pair of phenomena are determined by common factors such as 
weak institutions, poor human capital, and low productivity.  
It seems to make sense, so, to add variables regarding refugees and illegal trafficking 
of people. Another indicator that can be used is government effectiveness, which has an 
important influence on tax morale; so, according to Kelmanson’s Working Paper of 2019, an 
inverse relationship exists between the size of the shadow economy and the quality of 
government. 
Indeed, in the available previous literature, it seems that even a weak institutional 
quality is a determining factor. Indeed, a too high regulatory burden or a too low efficiency of 
government institutions, together with a weak rule of law, can participate in spreading 
corruption and so it can incentivize businesses enterprises from hire workers and encourage the 
activities considered as not legal (Kelmanson et al, 2019). 
So, weak governance, including corruption and weak judicial systems, has been found 
as very important to determine the shadow economy, in particular in the cross-relationship with 
regulation and some other variables. It has been verified that the effect of rules and financial 
constraints on informality is bigger with a better rule of the law (Dabla-Norris, et al., 2008) and 
with the dimension of governance exceeding certain levels (Oviedo, 2009). 
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Furthermore, there has been other evidence of the impact of the tax burden and of the 
tax administration on the shadow economy. If the set of the overall tax burden is bigger and/or 
the monitoring and application are smaller, so people feel more an incentive to evade tax and 
underestimate the salary.(Schneider & Williams; 2013, Hassan & Schneider; 2016). 
Finally, it can’t be left the high dependence that terrorism has from Money 
Laundering, indeed various are the typologies in the way this dependence work, such as the 
attempts to fight this financing system from dirty money to the terroristic cells (Perkel, 2004; 
Irwin, Choo, Liu, 2012; Gordon, 2010) 
4.3 Defining variables and hypothesis 
After the definition of choice of data, the databases used to collect data are chosen 
among the most popular databases, such as UNODC, WorldBank, Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), Eurostat, Eurobank, Fiscal Health Index, 
Transparency International, etc., and among others less known; so, I built a database and a 
model with data on countries in the following way: 
• The period considered is a 20-year time span between 2000 and 2019. However, hardly 
any data for a single indicator is present for all years. The indicators taken into 
consideration are manifold, and can alternatively assume the value of an explanatory 
variable, an implicit variable, and a control variable. Various control variables have 
been taken into consideration, such as growth, government effectiveness, etc., since I 
must gather as many aspects as possible that could distort my regression (see Annex 
A1) 
• The model used to study the phenomenon is so based on MIMIC implemented with an 
OLS regression model, which is analyzed through the use of the GRETL software. With 
this model, I want to investigate a correlation between money laundering and 
electronic-money. The software used to carry out the analysis, as mentioned, is GRETL. 
Through the use of information regarding money laundering, electronic money, other illicit 
activities, and other information on the use of cash and/or not, I want to see if a transition to the 
cashless society could somehow reduce money laundering and some decrease in illegal activity. 
As already seen, there are several studies that favor a positive response but are often 
limited to a single country. With this analysis, I want to find an effect that can be considered as 
general  
Different regression lines will be estimated, alternately using as: 
i) Explanatory variable: The choice of these variables is made according to the literature review 
of the first chapter and with the ground of the last paragraph; so, the link that these indicators 
have with ML is testified by various authors:  
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-Corruption Perception Index, (Kelmanson et al., 2019; Dabla-Norris, et al., 2008) 
-Government Effectiveness, (Kelmanson et al., 2019;  Dabla-Norris, et al., 2008; Oviedo, 
2009) 
-log number of Arrests for terrorism (Perkel, 2004; Irwin et al., 2012; Gordon, 2010) 
-log number of Refugees, (Rogoff, 2016; Kelmanson et al., 2019; Ivlevs, 2016) 
-log unlawful Acts involving drug use or traffic. (Lombardi, 2018; Barone et al., 2017). 
 
ii) Different variables are used as dependent variables relating to the use of electronic money 
and online transactions, both by companies and individuals, and data concerning the possession 
and use of payment cards. So, the choice has been based on the indicators of what I want to 
observe, based on the purpose of the thesis, so the availability of firms to move toward an online 
market (1), the amount of cards and operations, such transfers, made with cards (2), the 
availability of reaching cash for people, estimated with the amount of cash machines for  
100.000 people (3), the spread of electronic banking, digital wallet, etc in the population (4), 
and the propensity of people to E-commerce (5). 
1 - Online sales of companies  
2 - Number of cards 
3 - Amount of ATM 
4 - E-banking 
5 E-commerce 
 
iii) Finally, as control variables there is a difficult choice since the number is large; those that 
are best suited to my task are, according to the same literature review that bases the choice of 
dependent variables (Dittmar, 2018; Schneider & Williams; 2013, Hassan & Schneider; 2016; 
Rogoff, 2016): : 
- Corruption 
- Gini Index  
- Corruption Perception Index 
- Government Effectiveness 
-Tax burden  
In the second part, however, variables that act as explanatory can become direct 
variables. In analyzing whether, indeed, a push towards e-money could give a boost to 
economic growth, even with the help of the alleged decrease in money laundering, the latter 
becomes variable to explain, together with other factors such as the data just mentioned. In this 
second part, the only explanatory variable is economic growth, estimated to be a growth in 
GDP.  
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As already highlighted, therefore, the hypotheses on which I base myself are 
substantially two: 
1) To an increase and enhancement of electronic money at the expense of physical cash, the 
recycling of the latter undergoes a proven decrease 
H0: no decrease 
H1: decrease 
2) A boost to technological innovation in the financial sector, therefore his abandonment of 
cash, with its benefits, also contributes to increasing economic growth. 
H0: no economic growth with technological innovation in the economy 
H1: Economic growth 
 From these two main hypotheses, it's possible to get other hypotheses as a consequence of those 
two analysed more deeply:   
1) 
a) Support for the shift towards a cashless society also affects the international rankings of 
indicators such as CPI. Moreover, this shift will help the government to perform its 
functions more easily 
b) Investments in electronic money, incentives for the use of electronic money, etc. make 
human trafficking and drug trafficking and the emergence of terrorist cells more 
difficult; 
c) A state with more traceable transactions is a less corrupt state 
2) a) E-money moderates the effect of ML on growth; with a decrease of ML due to the increase 
of E-money and the decrease of cash, it will increase economic growth. 
4.4 Applying the model  
After, the analysis will be implemented at different times, each time with a different 
dependent variable among the indicators chosen as the determinant of money laundering or 
shadow economy. The method is, as above, a direct approach based on the hypothesis of the 
MIMIC model, according to which, an unobservable variable can be estimated with those 
indicators seen as a determinant of that (Tekwe et al., 2014; Schneider, 2019). In my work, 
using the Fixed Effect method for Panel data, a relation between the indicator considered as a 
determinant, and indicators regarding the incentives for e-money will be analyzed. Besides the 
theoretical ground that gives validity to the choice of variables, the determinants will be 
checked twice, using the OLS model, with the indicators used as approximations for "ML”.  
One estimation checks directly the effect of the variables considered as determinants of ML on 
ML itself, that is, so, used as variable Y and the supposed determinants as X variables. The 
other one is indirect, i.e. will be checked the effect of the “cashless” indicators on ML, looking 
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for coherence with the effects found for variables of electronic money on the determinants of 
ML. These estimations will be done at the end because, singularly, don't have too much 
significance because of the few amounts of data directly referred to money laundering, but 
together, as "check" of the other regression they can get validity.  
After, the analysis will focus on the effect of the combined effect of variables 
indicators of “cashless” and indicators of money laundering, on economic growth. The model 
will be the same OLS model and two estimations will be done because all the variables linked to 
money laundering with all those linked to cashless would be too many. The models estimated 
will be three different, on the base of the variables indicators of “cashless” chosen:  
- The first is related to the amount of cash and cards 
- The second studies the relation of economic growth with E-banking 
- The third studies the relation of economic growth with E-commerce 
 
Continuing on the path chosen for the method, so, the models are estimated using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method using the GRETL software applying the Fixed Effect 
model. Non-negative quantitative variables are logged to take advantage of the variation instead 
of the stock data. Time dummy variables are inserted. 
FE analyzes the relationship between the variables considered as predictors and result 
variables internal to the entity in question. Every entity has its own characteristics that can or 
can't modify the behave of predictive variables. With the use of FE it is controlled for the 
assumption that something inside the individual can influence or distort the predictor or the 
outcome variables., as its normal to think to talk about economic growth and institution. This is 
the basic logic of the correlation assumed between the entity's error term and its predictive 
variables. The FE is needed to remove the effect of the invariant characteristics over time 
allowing to evaluate the net effect of predictors on the result variable  
Using ML/rate as a consecutive variable, the use of time dummy variables is essential, 
given the limited period of data available compared to the period considered in my thesis and 
the dummy variables of the period available will, therefore, be selected. 
The analysis is so made with 5 models, using 5 different dependent variables Y: 
- Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) 
- Government Effectiveness (World Bank) 
- log Number of Arrests for terrorism  (UNODC) 
- log number of Refugees (Fiscal Health Index) 
- log Unlawful Acts involving drug use or trafficking (UNODC) 
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The following variables X (independent) come from databases such as Eurostat and 
Eurosystem; the period analyzed is still 20 years, from 200  to 2020, but each of the available 
data is hardly covering the full period.  
-log of Enterprises selling online in the Real Estate sector 
-log of Enterprises selling online in the Construction sector  
-log of Ebaking and Commerce/ internet banking %of individuals  
-log of Ebaking and Commerce /internet commerce %of individuals  
-log of Automated Teller Machines ATMs for 100.000 inhabitants  
-Growth rate in the number of card payments -growth rate in the number of credit transfers 
 
Variables X as control variables are: 
-Global Insight Country Risk (Transparency International) 
-Residential property price index (Eurosystem) 
-d_l_GDPpc (World Bank) 
-Gdebt (World Bank) 
-Tax Burden (Fiscal Health Index) 
-GINI index (World Bank) 
-and also some of the variables used as the Y variable. 
For the second part of the analysis, d_l_GDPpc (World Bank) will be used as dependent 
variables, because the effect that I aim to study is on that. 
 
 The work of collecting and analyzing data has been long and hard; the data collected, 
also, sometimes lacked in some years; indeed, the work of approximation of the indicators has 
been longer than expected. 
 
By the way, the estimation has shown information that can be considered trustful, in 
the proportion of the data managed to collect. The results, presented in the next chapter, can be 
satisfactory and in line with what the hypotheses were. 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1 Estimations 
The validity of the approximations used on-site variables of the ML variable is 
supported by the literature. For each regression, will be checked the single p-value for the 
interesting indicator and the statistical F. The determination coefficient R2, measures the 
goodness of the regression, but for these regressions, due to the amount of data available not 
always too big, could be high, showing a possible presence of autocorrelation; for all the cases 
of a very high level of R2 or Within R2, the Durbin-Watson test has always shown no presence 
of autocorrelation. 
I insist, anyway, that the validity of my analysis is not given by the single regression 
but from the coherent values shown from each of them.  
To verify, however, a model with explanatory variable l_ML and variables x is first 
implemented, the variables that are used as an approximation. The time frame available for ML 
is limited, so the estimation made  it is only useful to check the coherence with the results that 
will be obtained previously in model Check (too see all estimations, check Annexes and the end 
of the chapter)  
It is clear that the number of refugees, for example, affects the ML rate, thus against 
illegal acts involving the control and use of drugs and the tax burden. 
5.2 Estimation of the models 
The estimation is divided into two parts, as 2 are the hypothesis that is aimed to be 
tested. The first concerns the relationship between ML and E-Money; the 2nd will take care of 
analyzing E-money and its effect moderated with ML on economic growth. 
5.2.1 Part 1 of the model: impact of cashless on Money Laundering 
 
To estimate the following model, previously estimated indicators will be selected, this 
time, as explanatory variables of ML; furthermore, variable illicit acts (drugs) involving the 
control or public dissemination of drugs (DRUGS in the model) will also be taken into 
consideration. This addition is made because, although the DRUG indicator has little support in 
the literature, although it does have one, it has shown, through statistical analysis, to be 
significantly correlated to ML; moreover, the sign of the correlation is the least, which means 
that the dependence is therefore negative, this is because an increase in reports of illegal acts 
concerning drugs, therefore of new arrests and/or investigations, can lead to new knowledge in 
the criminal field which, inter alia, could also be used to combat money laundering. 
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Another estimation with ML as the dependent variable will be made as a "check" that 
the previous findings are corrected. A coherence among all the results will be searched for. 
In the first part of the model, I start by estimating the refugee variable with the various 
information available on the electronic economy, highly correlated variables both in literature 
and in statistical analysis, and with control variables considered in some way determinants of 
money laundering. According to the established hypothesis, the main purpose is to find βi=0. 
2) l_Refugeepopulationbycountry =
⍬ +	 + _ ! "###"$%"& +
	'_ ! "###"$%"/)%#  + *_+&,"$&-.%// ./
 − +&, + 1_+&,"$&-.%// ."/ − .%// +
2_34%/&- /&.ℎ"#367# + 8-__9:;!. +
<6&=>4 - + ?$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -! +
B9 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" + C);D + 9-+ +
'$%EAA + 4 
 
 
From results showing in tables in annexes, it's possible to see that the p-value is low 
for single variables and all estimation (p-value for F-statistic), so the significance is present, 
although it’s not considerably high. In addition, the R-framework is also high, testifying that the 
regression is "good". 
By analyzing with ROBUST for standard errors, the following results are obtained (Annexes) 
While the percentage of refuges seems to decrease for an increase of E-commerce and 
online activity of Real Estate sector, it seems to increase for a rise in the rate of E-banking and 
online activities of enterprises in the construction sector. 
 
3) As a second model to estimate I choose the one with government efficiency as 
Y; in the literature, it has been repeatedly referred to as one of the culprits of a 
bad judicial system, with corruption, bribes, and with room for the spread of 
crimes such as money laundering. 
 
goveff = ⍬ +	 + _ ! "###"$%"/G
+	'_ ! "###"$%"/)%# 
+ *_+&,"$&-.%// ./ − +&,
+ 1_+&,"$&-.%// ."/ − .%//
+ 2$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -!
+ 89 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" + <9DHD"-= + ?9-+
+ B3G#"-"&; %! I; ".D ++C6&=>4 -
+ _34%/&- /&.ℎ"#367# + ');D + 4 
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Also, in this case, the estimators of interest are significant, indicating a relationship 
between the explanatory variable and the x variables. Again the analysis is proposed with the 
use of ROBUST. 
The effect of these indicators is really interesting. E-banking and E-commerce have 
different effects on government effectiveness; if E-banking has helped to improve the efficiency 
of the government, maybe allowing more people to get a bank account, even where the physic 
banks were absent, only using a mobile phone. In this way the amount of people with a bank 
account has surely increased, going to decrease the strength of unregulated transactions. 
Regarding the growth of the use of cards and credit transfer, it has been shown a 
negative effect caused by their increase. That's against the hypothesis and the preview literature. 
Maybe it could show a first arrangement of criminals to the world of the digital. 
4) Regarding arrests for terrorism, help seems given by the E-banking; this is in 
line, also, with the results found for government effectiveness. Moreover, also 
the number of ATM for 100,000 inhabitants increased the number of arrests; 
seems, in this way, that an incentive to cash brings to an increase of the terrorist 
activity 
5)  
 
);D = ⍬ +	 + _+&,"$&-.%// ."/ − .%//
+	'_ ! "###"$%"/G
+ *_ ! "###"$%"/)%# 
+ 1_+&,"$&-.%// ./ − +&,
+ 2$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -!
+ 89 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" + <9DHD"-= + ?6&=>4 -
+ B_34%/&- /&.ℎ"#367#
+ C3G#"-"&; %! I; ".D + 4 
 
 
Corruption exists with money laundering, therefore it was chosen to study a model 
with the Corruption Perception Index as a variable Y. Again, the estimate showed interesting 
values and significant statistical significance. 
For the Corruption Perception Index, also, it has been found a negative effect of 
internet banking among individuals but a positive by e-commerce, while the effect of growth in 
cards has been again negative. Also, ATM's spread is directly involved, and highly, with 
corruption. It means that the effect that directly decreases and deactivates the use of cash 
decrease also the corruption in the country. 
 
6) l_DRUGS = ⍬ +	 + _ ! "###"$%"/G +
'_ ! "###"$%"/)%#  + *_+&,"$&-.%// ./
 − +&, +	1_+&,"$&-.%// ."/ − .%// +
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2_34%/&- /&.ℎ"#367# + 8);D + <$%EAA +
?-A__9:;!. + B$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -! +
C9 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" + 4 
 
Regarding the Unlawful acts involving drug use and traffic, results seem to be quite in 
line with what was expected. An increase in online activity decreases \the amount of these 
illegal acts. There are anyway increased by an increase in the activity of firms in the Real Estate 
sector and from the activity of E-commerce, and it seems clear with the spread of the drug 
market in the black market. 
Also, the availability for cash (ATMs) shows a positive relationship with these acts; 
indeed use of cash increase a bit the spread of these acts, which, anyway, are increased also by 
the spread of cards for payments, usually also used in the drug market online. 
 
7) CHECK 
 
l_MLRate = ⍬ +	 + _+&,"$&-.%// ./ − +&,
+	'_+&,"$&-.%// ."/ − .%//
+ *_ ! "###"$%"/)%# 
+ 1_ ! "###"$%"/G
+ 2$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -!
+ 89 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" + <9DHD"-=
+ ?_34%/&- /&.ℎ"#367# + 4 
 
With this last estimation is checked the relation also of ML with the data regarding 
electronic money. With this, I want to estimate directly the effect on those indicators on money 
laundering. It is the last estimation because data regarding money laundering are really limited 
and that can compromise the validity of the estimation. Anyway, the results of this estimation 
are in line with those found in the previous estimations and so, this one, if alone could not have, 
maybe, a great significance, as a "check" for the other estimation it could work. It shows, 
especially, results in line with those regarding refugees, trafficking of people, government 
effectiveness, and terrorist arrests. The results are not in line with those found with CPI and 
Unlawful acts involving drugs. 
5.2.2 Part 2: Effect on economic growth 
 
For the estimation of economic growth, it will be used the logarithm-1st difference-
GDPpc, to give values of growth. For this estimation will be used multiplied variables to test 
how electronic payments moderate ML’s effect on growth. So, variables about electronic 
payment and ML will be multiplied and the variables chosen are based on the last estimation of 
the first part, where it is shown the better approximations of ML with government effectiveness, 
trafficking of people, refugees, and terrorist arrests. The moderate with e-money effect of ML 
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on growth is estimated with the moderate effect of CPI on growth with growth in the number of 
cards; moderate effect of goveff with ATM on growth; moderate effect of refugees by ATMs on 
growth; moderate effect; moderate effect of goveff with E-commerce on growth; moderate 
effect of refugees with E-commerce on growth; The method will be the same of the first part, so 
there will be three analysis, each one with common X variables and some differences too, to 
catch all the possible behaviors of the variables studied. 
  
1) d_l_GDPpc =
⍬ +	 + _ ! "###"$%"/)%#  +
'_+&,"$&-.%// ./ − +&, + *_:GR9S +
1_3G#"-"&; %! I; ".D + 2);DT$ %@ℎ4/+.& - +
8$%EAAT367 + <_ AT&/ + ?$%EAAT.%// + B_.%//T A +
C$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -! +	9 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" +
'6&=>4 - + 4 
 
2) d_l_GDPpc =
⍬ +	 + _ ! "###"$%"/)%#  +
'_+&,"$&-.%// ./ − +&, + *_:GR9S +
1_3G#"-"&; %! I; ".D + 2);DT$ %@ℎ4/+.& - +
8$%EAAT367 + <_ AT&/ + ?$%EAAT.%// + B_.%//T A +
C$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -! +	9 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" +
'6&=>4 - + '_.%/%- 4$# + 4 
 
3) d_l_GDPpc =
⍬ +	 + _ ! "###"$%"/)%#  +
'_+&,"$&-.%// ./ − +&, + *_:GR9S +
1_3G#"-"&; %! I; ".D + 2);DT$ %@ℎ4/+.& - +
8$%EAAT367 + <_ AT&/ + ?$%EAAT+&, + B_+&,T);D +
C$ %@ℎ &"4/+ %A.& -! +	9 %@ℎ &"4/+ %A. -" +
'6&=>4 - + '_+&,%- 4$# + '_+&,"$&-.%// ./ −
.%// + 4 
 
 
 
And the hypothesis: 
H0:  β1=0; β2=0; β3=0; β5=0; β6=0; β7=0; β8=0; β9=0; β10=0; β11=0 
H1:  β1≠0; β2≠0; β3≠0; β5≠0; β6≠0; β7≠0; β8≠0; β9≠0; β10≠0; β11≠0 
(F-statistic) 
 
Added to the same hypothesis for not the whole estimations but also for the single β of interest 
(T-statistic) 
 
1)  
 
The values found to show different views but, mostly, they have a “negative” 
interpretation (or at least not expected); i.e., an increase of the online activities of firms in Real 
Estate sector brings to a decrease of growth, while an increase in the use of internet banking has 
an increasing effect on growth.  
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An increase in unlawful acts regarding the drug, increase also the growth. This could 
be also read as an "increase of reported acts" so translating in better effectiveness of the 
government and better-tracked crimes. 
The moderate effect of CPI on economic growth, with growth in the number of cards, 
is shown significant and negative for growth; moderate effect of goveff with ATM on growth as 
well, so that the moderate effect of refugees by ATMs on growth. However, a moderate effect 
of goveff with E-commerce on growth and moderate effect of refugees with E-commerce on 
growth shows significant positive effects on growth. 
 
2)  
The last estimation is run once with indicators regarding E-commerce and controlled 
for E-banking, and once vice versa. It was found, again, an increasing effect of acts related to 
drugs (use and trafficking) on growth. Also, a light effect of the growth of card is present, 
significant but low, while is significant the moderation effect of drugs for E-commerce on 
growth. 
For this part, the results have been found in line with what was expected but not all. 
Decreasing effects on growth have been found for an increase in construction enterprises' online 
activities and also some effects of electronic indicators moderated with those regarding ML. For 
example, the growth of numbers of the card has increased corruption and the overall effect is a 
decrease in growth; this effect is estimated in all the estimations and is also coherent because 
CPI has been seen as negatively correlated with economic growth. Also, the effect of an 
increase in cash availability, with increasing ATM, on government effectiveness would show a 
decrease in growth. The growth given by the increasing of cards is also proved in all the 
estimations. In general, by the way, if the growth seems certain regarding only indicators of 
electronic money, with the moderated effect it doesn't seem like that. E-commerce and E-
banking seem to work well for economic growth, even if it's interesting to notice that the 
moderated effect of E-commerce with drug trafficking on growth is positive. 
5.3 Discussion of the Results 
The  table 1 and table 2 synthesize the signs and the level of significance of variables of interest 
for the effects of cashless on Money Laundering.  
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  Table 1 : Signs and significance of ML estimations (1) 
 
•       = no significance 
• *    = significance 10%, p-value < 0.01 (min significance) 
• **  = significance 5%, p-value < 0.05 
• ***= significance 1%, p-value < 0.01 (max significance) 
 
 
 
Table 2 : signs and significance of ML estimations (2) 
 E-banking ATMs growthCard GrowthCredit 
Refugees +                  *     -                       +                       - 
+               ***       -                       +                       -                      * 
TraffickPeople/convicted -                       -                       -                       + 
-                       -                 ***     -                       + 
Gov/eff -                   *    +                       -                      * -                      ** 
-                  **    +                       -                 ***     -                      ** 
CPI -                  **    +                ***      -                      * -                       
-                ***      +                ***     -                   ***    -                       
Terrorism Arrest -                ***      + + - 
-                  **    + + - 
drugs -                      +                   **    +                      - 
-                       +                   * +                  ***    - 
ML rate +                   *    +                                           +          * +                      ** 
+                ***     +                 ***     +                 ***     +                    ***   
•       = no significance 
• *    = significance 10%, p-value < 0.01 (min significance) 
• **  = significance 5%, p-value < 0.05 
• ***= significance 1%, p-value < 0.01 (max significance) 
 
The work of collecting and analyzing data has been long and hard; the data collected, 
also, sometimes lacked in some years; indeed, the work of approximation of the indicators has 
been longer than expected. 
  EntSellOn/RE EntSellOn/Cons E-commerce 
Refugees normal -                      ** +                      ** -                 *** 
robust -        *** +                      *** -                  *** 
TraffickPeople/convicted normal -                      * + -                      * 
robust -                      * + -                  ** 
Gov/eff normal +                       - +                   * 
robust +                       - +                  ** 
CPI normal +                      ** - +                 *** 
robust +                      ** - +                 *** 
Terrorism Arrest normal                                         
robust                                         
drugs normal +                       -                      ** +                       
robust +                      ** -                      *** +* 
ML rate normal +                + -                                           
robust +                +                     * -                  *** 
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By the way, the estimation has shown information that can be considered trustful, in 
the proportion of the data managed to collect. The results can be satisfactory and in line with 
what the hypotheses were. 
Particularly important were the values assumed by the estimators in the regression 
equation which related the different determinants of money laundering or the shadow economy; 
very often, the estimates were characterized by very small p-values, evidence of a relationship 
of statistical relevance between the two observations. 
Talking more specifically, a high significance was found with almost all the variables 
of interest, even if not always coherent. For example, for refugees it was found evidence for 
both enterprises selling online and e-commerce/internet banking; by the way, if for E-banking it 
was a positive relationship, for e-commerce was negative. It means that, while the percentage of 
refugees seems to decrease for an increase of E-commerce and online activity of the Real Estate 
sector, it seems to increase for a rise in the rate of E-banking and online activities of enterprises 
in the construction sector. The construction sector has been often involved, especially in the 
developing parts of the world but not only, in the use of refugees and immigrants for their work. 
An increase in the number of refugees due to the increase of online trade of firms in the 
construction sector could mean the involvement of enterprises in cyber-crime or also the so-
called "transaction laundering", 
The same has been found for the estimation that had "government effectiveness" as a 
dependent variable. Moreover, it's interesting to see that here a high significance has been found 
for the rate of cards for inhabitant and rate for credit transfer, but this significance is related to a 
negative correlation. It means that the effectiveness of the government has decreased with the 
growth of these two data. The effect of these indicators is really interesting. E-banking and E-
commerce have different effects on government effectiveness; E-banking has helped to improve 
the efficiency of the government, maybe allowing more people to get a bank account, even 
where the physic banks were absent, only using a mobile phone. In this way the amount of 
people with a bank account has surely increased, going to decrease the strength of unregulated 
transactions. E-commerce, by the way, involves also business in the dark market. 
Regarding the growth of the use of cards and credit transfer, it has been shown a 
negative effect caused by their increase. That’s against the hypothesis and the preview literature. 
Maybe it could show the first arrangement of criminals to the world of the digital 
With Corruption Perception Index as Y variable, indeed, the results are really 
satisfying; for E-commerce and online trade by Real Estate firms, the relationship is positive, 
i.e. it is shown an increase of CPI with the increase of these two indicators. Anyway, Real 
Estate is a sector historically related to ML activities and corruption, and E-commerce as well. 
By the way, an increase of E-banking is related to a decrease of Corruption, indeed it makes 
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higher the number of tracked transactions; E-banking is connected to the inverse effect of the 
growth of the number of cards to CPI. 
Also, clear evidence is given by the incentive to use cash (ATM for 100,000 
inhabitants) to a push up of the perception of Corruption. 
Regarding arrests for terrorism, really help seems given by the E-banking; this is in 
line, also, with the results found for government effectiveness. Moreover, also the number of 
ATM for 100,000 inhabitants increased the number of arrests; seems, in this way, that 
inventiveness to cash brings to an increase of the terrorist activity 
Regarding the unlawful acts connected to drugs, they seem to decrease with an 
increase of transaction system of the construction sector, moving toward an online market, 
while it seems to increase with the increase of the number of ATM (cash) and with the E-
commerce; it's useful to remind that E-shop of the market are really diffused on Dark Web but 
also in the clear one, like in social networks such as Instagram or Telegram, and on of their 
function, often, is the one of recycling money. 
The estimation with ML helps to check if the values found in the other estimations are 
trustful, and it seems especially for estimations with refugees, trafficking of people, government 
effectiveness, and rate of terrorist arrests.  
From the annexes, it’s possible to check the significance of each estimation in its integrity with 
the low p-value of F-statistic. 
 
 
 
 
The  table 3 synthesize the signs and the level of significance of variables of interest for the 
effect of cashless on economic growth, considering both direct and indirect (moderated with 
money laundering) effect 
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Table 3 : signs and significance of growth estimations 
 
1 estimation of 
Growth 
2 estimation of 
growth 
3 estimation of 
growth 
 
Norm robust norm robust norm robust 
selling Online/CON  -          ** -   ***  -    **    -       ***  -  -         ** 
SellingOnline/RE      -      *   -        *     
E-banking  +          **  +    **  +         +       **     
E-commerce          +      *    +     ***   
ATM     - -  -   - 
Growthofcards  +          *** +   ***  +         +       *  +  +        * 
GrowthofCT  +          ** +   ***  +         +         +  + 
Drugs  +          ** +  ***  +     *    +       **  +   +        ** 
CPI             
E-bankXDrug          +  + 
E-BankXCPI          +  + 
E-bankingtoGoveff  +        +  +        * 
E-commtoDrug      +        +      ***     
E-commtoGoveff  +              +         +            
E-commtoRef  +          *    -        -           
CPIXgrowthofcards  -          *** -   ***  -         -        **     -       *  -        ** 
ATMtoGoveff  -          ** -  ***   -         -        **     -  -        *** 
ATMtoRef  -          * -  ***   +         +         +   +  
•       = no significance 
• *    = significance 10%, p-value < 0.01 (min significance) 
• **  = significance 5%, p-value < 0.05 
• ***= significance 1%, p-value < 0.01 (max significance) 
 
 
For the 2nd part, the one about the effect of Money Laundering/cashless on growth, the results 
have been found in line with what was expected. Decreasing effects on growth have been found 
for an increase in construction enterprises' online activities and also some effects of electronic 
indicators moderated with those regarding ML. For example, the growth of the numbers of the 
card has increased corruption and the overall effect is a little decrease in growth for values 
smaller than 0.00001. Also, the effect of an increase in cash availability, with increasing ATM, 
on government effectiveness would show a decrease in growth. In the same way is moderated 
the effect of ATM with refugees, because it still negative and significant.  
In line with the previous part, the effect of E-commerce on growth moderated by 
government effectiveness shows an increase in growth. The same with the moderated effect 
with refugees, of E-commerce, on growth. 
The effect of growth cards and growth of credit transfer is increasing the growth, but 
being CPI x Growthcards <0, it means that the negative effect of CPI is stronger than the 
positive given by the growth of cards in the payment system. 
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Regarding enterprises that started to sell online, negative effects have been tested for 
growth. 
The F-statistics is significant at a level of 99% for the 1st  estimation of economic 
growth, and at a level of 95% for the others. 
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6. Conclusions 
Technological improvements definitely involved the area of economy and finance. 
Merchants of all kinds saw the opportunities arising from these new developments and seem 
they want to move to reach new richness. The same satisfaction, anyway, has not been found for 
who each day fights against illicit activity its consequences such as Money Laundering and 
Shadow Economy. A certain level of intrusting has been found on the new digital payment 
systems and new developments arisen, also from the criminal side, for the usage of these new 
items. In this way also, outcomes on the Economy and the criminal activity of money 
laundering are uncertain but, anyway, probably not so positive as expected. 
 As a first conclusion, it seems right to think that the improvement of use E-commerce 
doesn’t increase Money Laundering, but it can decrease it. This effect has been used to test the 
effect of the increase in the rate of E-commerce activity for % individuals. For all the 
estimations the results were coherent, E-commerce has always shown a decreasing significant 
effect on the variables Y considered. It was found with an increasing effect for CPI that, by the 
way, someway had a decreasing effect on ML. 
The effect on unlawful acts involving drugs doesn’t seem to have a decreasing power. 
Anyway, as I said already, E-commerce is used also for drug dealing. Anyway, an increasingly 
significant effect is shown only with a robust estimation. Anyway, this could be interpreted as 
an improvement of crime detection; in this way, the value would be coherent, or at least not in 
contrast, with those found in the other estimations. 
The overall effect can be considered valid; also, the last check with ML estimation has 
been coherent. Also, the increase of the shift toward and online market from the Real Estate 
sector seems to give results similar to those of E-commerce and overall coherent in the same 
way. I.e., the effect is showing as decreasing all the determinants to which the relation is 
significant, expect, exactly like for E-commerce, for CPI. The Real Estate sector, indeed, has 
always been a sector for launderers to infiltrate, so a transition to a more regulated payment 
system should decrease the problem given by suspicious transactions. 
E-bank had shown, in the various estimations, coherence as well. The relationship 
with ML seems to be, anyway, the opposite of the one observed by E-commerce. Indeed, an 
increased effect on that seems to exist. Anyway, often digital wallet and E-bank let do money 
transfers also to who doesn't have a digital account; anyway, the E-banking has been found 
influencing negatively government effectiveness and the number of arrests related with 
terrorism. Anyway, this banking activity is quite new and is still not such regulated like real 
banking. Anyway, the effect could be read also as "fewer arrests for terrorism means that with 
E-banking, a terrorist cell can connect with more difficulties. However, the negative relation of 
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an increase of E-banking activity on government effectiveness and the increasing relation with 
the number of refugees (besides that with ML) suggest that this is not the case. 
This can be related to the observation consequent of the findings for the growth of the 
number of cards per inhabitant and the growth of the number of credit transfers. Indeed, and it's 
quite interesting, the growth of these two indicators seems related to the growth of Money 
Laundering. Anyway, in the literature, especially from payments reports, it was found how 
credit and debit card, especially prepaid, are mostly instruments through which illegal money 
move because some give (especially in the USA) a certain grade of anonymity. So, credit or 
debit cards, maybe even related to E-banking accounts, showed a significant decrease in 
government effectiveness. Moreover, with the opposite relation with CPI, it is also confirmed 
the increasing relation with ML. The growth of the number of credit transfer has not been found 
significant, even if the direction of the results is still in line with results found with growth of 
the number of cards and E-banking. 
The number of ATMs for 100,000 inhabitants has been used to test the spread of cash 
and incentive to use it: more ATMs give more availability of liquidity and facilitate the wish to 
"withdraw" money. It has been found, anyway, that an increase of ATMs for 100,000 
inhabitants relates to a decrease in the number of people convicted for illegal trafficking of 
people. Due to the other results, it seems that an increase of availability of cash has only 
negative consequences: increase the trafficking of drugs, increase the perception of corruption 
and decrease the traceability of smugglers of illegal immigrants; that can be translated in a, even 
if not too much accurate, increase of ML rate. 
The value regarding the construction enterprises selling online is ambiguous; indeed, 
even if is shown as really significant an increase on the number of refugees due to the increase 
of online activity of these enterprises, that seems in line with the literature that found high use 
of immigrants and refugees in the labor-intense sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and 
constructions. 
The other results seem not clear and especially are without significance. It was found a 
non-clear relation between the increase of construction enterprises selling online and the 
decrease of the acts involving drugs. Anyway, the effect on ML is seen as "increasing", but not 
so significant; this result is also coherent with those found with other estimations; checking the 
signs of the values, indeed, they seem to have a direction that is coherent with the sign found on 
the estimation with money laundering, that is positive but probably not statistically significant. 
Taking a general picture, therefore, the effect of the increase in money and electronic 
transactions to the detriment of those carried out using circulating money does not seem to have 
the desired results at all. What seems clear, however, and in line with the expectations suggested 
by the literature, is that the number of cash actually creates money laundering problems, the 
 71 
 
underground economy, and illegal activities in general. Although not all values were 
statistically different from 0, the signs were always the expected ones. So, at first glance, a 
move to a cashless society could suggest a decrease in illegal activities. However, this is closely 
linked to the money factor, which is still the preferred tool for illicit transactions. 
As for online commerce activities, online banks, the online market of different 
companies, and the use of payment cards, this is not yet certain but seems to go towards a little 
effect of these new methods, as regards the recycling of money. In fact, the only indicator that 
seems to be increasing the ML is growing, is E-commerce; moreover, even a transition to online 
activities of companies operating in the construction sector would not create an increase in 
money laundering but seems more oriented in the opposite direction. 
E-banking activity, with the spread of payment cards, would seem to increase money 
laundering. It was talked about money mules, which play a fundamental role in new 
developments in money laundering in the age of technology. Furthermore, money transfers are 
also possible to non-bank account holders; in Portugal, for example, MBway is an application 
connected to Multibanco, the Portuguese bank, which allows the transfer of money by passing a 
code that can be entered, in any Multibank counter, by anyone who can, therefore, perform the 
withdrawal of money without a trace. 
However, even for E-commerce, the result can be contingent. It has been said that 
money laundering tool, if not criminals of all kinds, is circulating money. While it is true that in 
a moment of "trial" and "transition" towards a cashless society, money is discouraged in favor 
of electronic money, the working capital continues to be present in all respects. An analysis 
should be more appropriate in the future, when new scenarios are available and the cash, at least 
in some realities, has actually been eliminated. Transaction Laundering, in fact, is a 
phenomenon that has already begun and can only exploit the new technological opportunities 
that will come to be more efficient and "safe", since these will be the needs of criminals if the 
cash were to fail. 
After all, money laundering, or the underground economy, obviously exists together 
with money and together with it evolves, just as the whole economy, history, society evolves. In 
general, so, I don’t feel to say that a transition to a cashless society would decrease the amount 
of money laundered. Or, as already said, if the decrease of physic cash could, especially in a 
short time, decrease and deficit the amount of money laundered, such as the amount of crimes 
related to that, an increase of electronics and technology could also give new opportunities to 
criminals. 
As for the second part of my analysis, that is the effect, both moderate and not from 
money laundering, of the transition to the cashless society on economic growth. 
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In this case, the conclusion is more immediate. Indeed, the results found were, first of 
all, consistent with those found in the first part of the analysis. In fact, E-commerce, in general, 
seems to not damage economic growth. Its effect, moderate with the key indicators of money 
laundering, doesn't decrease it, but, even if not significant, it shows positive values. There is a 
need to be careful, however: surely the amount of transactions has increased thanks to this 
opportunity, transactions that are more easily traceable on the one hand, therefore with positive 
outcomes for both ML and economic growth. But this world opens new scenarios, of crimes 
carried out not only in the dark web but also in the light one.  
In the other estimations, conclusions are more interesting. In fact, the results found 
were, first of all, consistent with those found in the first part of the analysis. In fact, E-
commerce, in general, seems to bring results that encourage economic growth, but this works 
only not taking into consideration the moderation of ML indicators. What is immediately to 
notice is that the growth in the number of payment cards would have a positive effect on 
growth, but this effect is not only canceled but even reversed if moderate with CPI; in fact, CPI 
has been noted as positively related to economic growth, that is, incredibly, an increase in this 
would lead to an increase in the economy. This result is consistent and consistent with other CPI 
interaction variable results. 
As for the other values, in general, I found what would be expected from a decrease in 
cash: fewer ATMs increase economic growth and this factor is not particularly moderated by the 
efficiency of the government which is not affected too much by this indicator. E-banking, on the 
other hand, decreases government capacity but this effect is less than that caused by online 
banking alone. This demonstrates a great help to the economy given by this factor, since, 
despite the interference given by a new world like that of E-banking, the "advantages" are 
already greater than the "disadvantages". As for E-commerce, this has increased drug trafficking 
activity, and economic growth has been affected! In fact, both the increase in the number of acts 
relating to drugs and the increase in E-commerce brings benefits. It remains to be clarified 
whether these acts are considered to be reported and reported because they are intercepted, so in 
this case, it would be easier for E-commerce to track illegal purchases online, or, conversely, 
this would only be an effect probably due to the increase in online trading activity. Anyway, 
always it’s important to be careful, however: surely the amount of transactions has increased 
thanks to this opportunity, transactions that are more easily traceable on the one hand, therefore 
with positive outcomes for both ML and economic growth. But this world opens new scenarios, 
of crimes carried out not only in the dark web but also in the light one. The growth in the 
number of cards also shows growth in the economy. However, as seen previously, the growth of 
payment cards also increases the perceived Corruption index, thus leading to a downturn in the 
economy. 
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Finally, it is fundamental to analyse the results regarding the effects moderated by 
government effectiveness and refugees for the ATM. In fact, it is clearly evident that an increase 
in the possibilities of using physical money has negative effects as regards the efficiency of the 
government, which decreases, the number of refugees, which increases, thus leading to a 
decrease in the economy. 
As a general consideration, anyway, it would seem that a transition to the cashless 
society would benefit the economy, but, the effect moderated with money laundering is not so 
positive. Be that as it may, the effect of policies that encourage electronic commerce activities 
and that discourage the use of cash, not considering the consequences that lead to ML 
indicators, lead to a general growth in the economy. This would seem, above all, to be a 
consequence more of the disappearance of cash than of a settlement of electronic money. Be 
that as it may, the effect of policies that encourage electronic commerce activities and that 
discourage the use of cash, with the consequences that lead to ML indicators, lead to a general 
growth in the economy. Anyway, a significant effect of abandoning cash moderated with the 
increase of government effectiveness or the decreasing effect on refugees will increase 
economic growth.  
The effect moderated by ML indicators seems, always, to decrease the expected effect 
that a transition to a cashless society has. This, considering the quite good effects seen for ML, 
could be explained with a part of GDP guided by the illegal economy.  
As already mentioned, the validity of this work is obtained by making the most of the 
amount of data available which, perhaps, would not have been very significant for a single 
analysis. With this evidence, my work aims to suggest an economic vision of the fight against 
the underground economy and money laundering. In general, this step would seem to bring 
benefits to the economy. As for the effect on money laundering, my expectations have also been 
quite fulfilled. A deeper analysis, however, could confirm what is suggested by this thesis. In 
fact, this work lacked since the beginning of a consistent amount of data for the phenomenon 
that I wanted to observe, but approaching in this method I could minimize this lack. Of course, 
anyway, problems of autocorrelation could arise but the Durbin-Watson test was always 
showing no presence of that. But this model could be limited in the “mechanic” way to 
implement it. Obviously, a higher number of data would allow a different and more specific 
analysis, but this thesis must be the basis for future analysis of the topic. For example, a simple 
test with another model of these. 
So, according to these results, the benefits deriving from the transition to a cashless 
society arises mostly from the abandoning of physic cash than from an increase of electronic 
market and payment system. This could suggest a short-term effect of a decrease of money, 
because, being it still the most spread payment system in the world, a disincentive to the use of 
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that could decrease the amount of money laundered that, still, is made mostly through cash. But 
new developments, new technology, a new era will increase the need of adaption from criminals 
who could, in the beginning, suffer a decrease of the use of cash but could, also, with time, 
arrange to use new sources and destination of illegal funds, even when they are not in a “paper” 
form.  This could explain, also, why the moderated effect of electronic money with money 
laundering doesn’t seem to have big implications on economic growth; anyway, abandoning 
cash in favor to a more technological society where payments are implemented by phones or 
other electronic items, seems to have good implications on growth, especially moving from cash 
to cards. For what concerns the new ways such as E-bank and E-commerce, it seems to help the 
economy to increase, even if the effect is not maybe so significant and not strong, because, 
among all, also of the nature of these methods that are new and so difficult. Or, maybe, their 
effect could be moderated by the endogenous effect that was found for money laundering: so, an 
increase of online payments, wallets, etc, doesn’t seem to have great implications on money 
laundering, because even if there is coherence among estimations, some variables seem to push 
ML up while some to decrease it. This effect, especially when is increasing ML, could have 
effects on economic growth as well that, if from one side it takes benefits from the spread of 
electronic transactions, from the other side it’s harmed by the possible increase of money 
laundering activity and the shadow economy. 
Moreover, right now it’s possible that a new technology revolution is going to bring 
substantial developments; the Covid-19 pandemic has forced almost the whole world at home, 
implementing what is called Smart-Working, even where, perhaps, there were still not all the 
necessary tools and regulations. In Italy, some companies have in fact used smart working to 
exploit employees and pocket the redundancy funds (Repubblica.it, 2020). Anyway, it has to be 
noted that, the recent pandemic crisis has and will certainly harm the global volume of world 
trade, but certainly, as is already happening, it will give a further strong boost to all forms of 
electronic commerce and cash dematerialization worldwide. All of these most recent facts could 
have irreversibly changed the world; if the transition to a cashless society seems now closer but 
not easy, a general push on technology seems instead the next future. It seems so long time ago 
when everything was still normal and computers, such as smartphones, tablets, were, for 
someone at least, were not more than useful instruments to make daily life easier. But now 
people is “stick” to computer more than ever, and the risks are always present. In order to really 
test the validity of the thesis, and so, of the model, an a posteriori estimation would be 
interesting; by the way, a transition to an electronic payment system, right now, could not have 
the expected hoped results. Even if it seems close, indeed, a lot of countries are starting to face a 
new economic crisis. So, a “revolution” like that, in a moment like this, could bring everywhere.  
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Technological developments (Cyber Security Intelligence, 2018) therefore, are now at 
the window and criminals everywhere where they are ready to exploit their opportunities. 
Believing that money laundering can die with electronic money still seems like a fairy-tale and 
would be interesting also to see if even during the pandemic crisis and in the next economic 
crisis, the activities of recycling money increased or decreased or if they just “shifted”. 
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Table 5 : A.2 Model 0  
Pooled OLS, using 20 observations 
Estimations: Unlawful acts = DRUGS 
Model 0: Pooled OLS, using 20 observations 
Included 5 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 4 
Dependent variable: l_MLRate 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 42.2764 5.42143 7.798 <0.0001 *** 
dt_14 −2.73864 1.00320 −2.730 0.0196 ** 
dt_15 −2.85545 0.991089 −2.881 0.0149 ** 
dt_16 −1.31733 0.896439 −1.470 0.1697  
CPI −0.145849 0.0744798 −1.958 0.0760 * 
goveff 3.00869 2.61957 1.149 0.2751  
l_Refugeepopulation
bycountryo 
4.02294 0.959837 4.191 0.0015 *** 
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
−2.11681 0.572993 −3.694 0.0035 *** 
TaxBurden −0.407631 0.0632305 −6.447 <0.0001 *** 
Mean dependent var  2.833827  S.D. dependent var  1.909399 
Sum squared resid  8.851495  S.E. of regression  0.897040 
R-squared  0.872218  Adjusted R-squared  0.779286 
F(8, 11)  9.385510  P-value(F)  0.000597 
Log-likelihood −20.22731  Akaike criterion  58.45462 
Schwarz criterion  67.41621  Hannan-Quinn  60.20402 
rho −0.643597  Durbin-Watson  2.314421 
 
White's test for heteroskedasticity - 
 Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 12.295 
 with p-value = P(Chi-square(13) > 12.295) = 0.503616 
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Table 6 : A.3 Model 1 
Fixed-effects, using 27 observations 
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_Refugeepopulationbycountryo 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 36.0303 13.6636 2.637 0.0779 * 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
−0.995173 0.301409 −3.302 0.0457 ** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
3.58433 0.854067 4.197 0.0247 ** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
5.43818 2.11856 2.567 0.0827 * 
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
−13.3826 3.09602 −4.323 0.0228 ** 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−1.90368 2.55911 −0.7439 0.5109  
d_l_GDPpc 8.29342 7.55069 1.098 0.3523  
TaxBurden −0.241040 0.0756468 −3.186 0.0498 ** 
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
7.47130e-06 1.32890e-05 0.5622 0.6132  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−1.91053e-05 1.78292e-05 −1.072 0.3625  
dt_12 −5.53299 1.40489 −3.938 0.0292 ** 
dt_14 −2.22915 0.670208 −3.326 0.0449 ** 
dt_15 −0.775258 0.402309 −1.927 0.1496  
dt_16 −0.807280 0.326216 −2.475 0.0897 * 
CPI 0.257154 0.0914131 2.813 0.0671 * 
Gdebt −0.0579721 0.0251799 −2.302 0.1048  
goveff 0.685663 2.00063 0.3427 0.7544  
 
Mean dependent var  3.402498  S.D. dependent var  1.737259 
Sum squared resid  0.150656  S.E. of regression  0.224095 
LSDV R-squared  0.998080  Within R-squared  0.975124 
LSDV F(23, 3)  67.80725  P-value(F)  0.002517 
Log-likelihood  31.73470  Akaike criterion −15.46941 
Schwarz criterion  15.63068  Hannan-Quinn −6.221720 
rho −0.727659  Durbin-Watson  2.733285 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(16, 3) = 7.34979 
 with p-value = P(F(16, 3) > 7.34979) = 0.0629373 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(7, 3) = 25.8084 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 3) > 25.8084) = 0.0110659 
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Table 7 : A.4 Model 1a 
 Fixed-effects, using 27 observations 
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_Refugeepopulationbycountryo 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 36.0303 6.34302 5.680 0.0008 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
−0.995173 0.181155 −5.493 0.0009 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
3.58433 0.358739 9.991 <0.0001 *** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
5.43818 1.17151 4.642 0.0024 *** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
−13.3826 1.12772 −11.87 <0.0001 *** 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−1.90368 1.23099 −1.546 0.1659  
d_l_GDPpc 8.29342 2.35943 3.515 0.0098 *** 
TaxBurden −0.241040 0.0283140 −8.513 <0.0001 *** 
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
7.47130e-06 9.04241e-06 0.8263 0.4359  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−1.91053e-05 8.81198e-06 −2.168 0.0668 * 
dt_12 −5.53299 0.521936 −10.60 <0.0001 *** 
dt_14 −2.22915 0.240023 −9.287 <0.0001 *** 
dt_15 −0.775258 0.168154 −4.610 0.0025 *** 
dt_16 −0.807280 0.213151 −3.787 0.0068 *** 
CPI 0.257154 0.0301720 8.523 <0.0001 *** 
Gdebt −0.0579721 0.0154746 −3.746 0.0072 *** 
goveff 0.685663 0.870268 0.7879 0.4566  
 
Mean dependent var  3.402498  S.D. dependent var  1.737259 
Sum squared resid  0.150656  S.E. of regression  0.224095 
LSDV R-squared  0.998080  Within R-squared  0.975124 
Log-likelihood  31.73470  Akaike criterion −15.46941 
Schwarz criterion  15.63068  Hannan-Quinn −6.221720 
rho −0.727659  Durbin-Watson  2.733285 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(16, 7) = 30.6978 
 with p-value = P(F(16, 7) > 30.6978) = 6.18214e-005 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(7, 5.7) = 0.832604 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 5.7) > 0.832604) = 0.598124 
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Table 8 : A.5 Model 1b 
Fixed-effects, using 26 observations 
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_TPpeopleconvicted 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −21.2976 22.0633 −0.9653 0.4056  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−4.37339 1.99042 −2.197 0.1155  
CPI 0.131961 0.0345469 3.820 0.0316 ** 
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
−1.56477e-05 2.25631e-05 −0.6935 0.5379  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
7.31233e-07 1.07173e-05 0.06823 0.9499  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
−0.586882 0.244551 −2.400 0.0959 * 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
0.324618 0.338475 0.9591 0.4083  
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−0.791135 1.66080 −0.4764 0.6664  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
−4.62211 1.54883 −2.984 0.0584 * 
goveff 1.27030 2.22896 0.5699 0.6086  
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
4.82020 2.40631 2.003 0.1389  
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
1.24945 2.17464 0.5746 0.6058  
dt_12 −2.11635 0.728104 −2.907 0.0622 * 
dt_14 −1.16587 0.607102 −1.920 0.1506  
dt_15 −1.37270 0.649663 −2.113 0.1250  
dt_16 −1.28762 0.333243 −3.864 0.0307 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  2.925577  S.D. dependent var  1.475714 
Sum squared resid  0.086379  S.E. of regression  0.169685 
LSDV R-squared  0.998413  Within R-squared  0.976609 
LSDV F(22, 3)  85.81124  P-value(F)  0.001776 
Log-likelihood  37.29997  Akaike criterion −28.59993 
Schwarz criterion  0.336290  Hannan-Quinn −20.26735 
rho −0.344138  Durbin-Watson  2.186181 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(11, 3) = 6.26566 
 with p-value = P(F(11, 3) > 6.26566) = 0.0787269 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(7, 3) = 34.3563 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 3) > 34.3563) = 0.0072929 
 
Wald joint test on time dummies - 
 Null hypothesis: No time effects 
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 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(4) = 27.4162 
 with p-value = 1.6376e-005 
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Table 9 : A.6 Model 1c 
Fixed-effects, using 26 observations 
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 1, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_TPpeopleconvicted 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −21.2976 23.5697 −0.9036 0.3962  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−4.37339 0.600477 −7.283 0.0002 *** 
CPI 0.131961 0.0271495 4.861 0.0018 *** 
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
−1.56477e-05 1.80938e-05 −0.8648 0.4158  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
7.31233e-07 9.12035e-06 0.08018 0.9383  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
−0.586882 0.276306 −2.124 0.0713 * 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
0.324618 0.254252 1.277 0.2424  
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−0.791135 1.12210 −0.7050 0.5036  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
−4.62211 1.37158 −3.370 0.0119 ** 
goveff 1.27030 1.18539 1.072 0.3194  
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
4.82020 2.56199 1.881 0.1020  
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
1.24945 0.972024 1.285 0.2395  
dt_12 −2.11635 0.600277 −3.526 0.0097 *** 
dt_14 −1.16587 0.529364 −2.202 0.0635 * 
dt_15 −1.37270 0.673726 −2.037 0.0810 * 
dt_16 −1.28762 0.339017 −3.798 0.0067 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  2.925577  S.D. dependent var  1.475714 
Sum squared resid  0.086379  S.E. of regression  0.169685 
LSDV R-squared  0.998413  Within R-squared  0.976609 
Log-likelihood  37.29997  Akaike criterion −28.59993 
Schwarz criterion  0.336290  Hannan-Quinn −20.26735 
rho −0.344138  Durbin-Watson  2.186181 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(11, 7) = 1184.1 
 with p-value = P(F(11, 7) > 1184.1) = 2.37407e-010 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(7, 9.0) = 0.604434 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 9.0) > 0.604434) = 0.740267 
Wald joint test on time dummies - 
 Null hypothesis: No time effects 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(4) = 189.172 
 with p-value = 7.98444e-040 
 
 97 
 
Table 10 : A.7 Model 2 
Fixed-effects, using 32 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: goveff 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.132421 2.17386 0.06092 0.9531  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
0.844457 0.360348 2.343 0.0516 * 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
0.0564855 0.0495569 1.140 0.2919  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.0802021 0.0852867 −0.9404 0.3783  
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−0.988006 0.476922 −2.072 0.0770 * 
dt_12 0.0517669 0.133411 0.3880 0.7095  
dt_14 −0.0796993 0.0783742 −1.017 0.3430  
dt_15 −0.0908339 0.0750809 −1.210 0.2656  
dt_16 0.0259294 0.0584140 0.4439 0.6705  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
−9.62205e-06 4.37401e-06 −2.200 0.0637 * 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−6.08807e-06 2.48068e-06 −2.454 0.0438 ** 
GINIindex 0.0780843 0.0434063 1.799 0.1151  
Gdebt −0.0120878 0.00342762 −3.527 0.0096 *** 
AResidentialPropert
yPriceIn 
−0.00729051 0.00347031 −2.101 0.0738 * 
TaxBurden 0.0109766 0.00974692 1.126 0.2972  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
0.732846 0.495476 1.479 0.1827  
CPI −0.0318471 0.0207595 −1.534 0.1689  
 
Mean dependent var  1.548411  S.D. dependent var  0.357590 
Sum squared resid  0.030363  S.E. of regression  0.065860 
LSDV R-squared  0.992340  Within R-squared  0.930841 
LSDV F(24, 7)  37.78675  P-value(F)  0.000027 
Log-likelihood  65.95837  Akaike criterion −81.91673 
Schwarz criterion −45.27333  Hannan-Quinn −69.77048 
rho −0.413165  Durbin-Watson  2.231796 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(16, 7) = 5.88852 
 with p-value = P(F(16, 7) > 5.88852) = 0.0120335 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 7) = 3.26592 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 7) > 3.26592) = 0.068273 
 98 
 
Table 11 : A.8 Model 2a 
Fixed-effects, using 32 observations 
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: goveff 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0.132421 1.89722 0.06980 0.9461  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
0.844457 0.280974 3.005 0.0169 ** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
0.0564855 0.0462005 1.223 0.2563  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.0802021 0.0569550 −1.408 0.1967  
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−0.988006 0.365973 −2.700 0.0271 ** 
dt_12 0.0517669 0.123024 0.4208 0.6850  
dt_14 −0.0796993 0.0266995 −2.985 0.0175 ** 
dt_15 −0.0908339 0.0289042 −3.143 0.0138 ** 
dt_16 0.0259294 0.0527053 0.4920 0.6360  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
−9.62205e-06 2.24667e-06 −4.283 0.0027 *** 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−6.08807e-06 2.59668e-06 −2.345 0.0471 ** 
GINIindex 0.0780843 0.0521012 1.499 0.1723  
AResidentialPropert
yPriceIn 
−0.00729051 0.00156251 −4.666 0.0016 *** 
TaxBurden 0.0109766 0.00835909 1.313 0.2255  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
0.732846 0.591027 1.240 0.2501  
Gdebt −0.0120878 0.00269163 −4.491 0.0020 *** 
CPI −0.0318471 0.0269756 −1.181 0.2717  
 
Mean dependent var  1.548411  S.D. dependent var  0.357590 
Sum squared resid  0.030363  S.E. of regression  0.065860 
LSDV R-squared  0.992340  Within R-squared  0.930841 
Log-likelihood  65.95837  Akaike criterion −81.91673 
Schwarz criterion −45.27333  Hannan-Quinn −69.77048 
rho −0.413165  Durbin-Watson  2.231796 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(16, 8) = 60.2431 
 with p-value = P(F(16, 8) > 60.2431) = 1.44656e-006 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(8, 7.0) = 0.659121 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 7.0) > 0.659121) = 0.71499 
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Table 12 : A.9 Model 3 
Fixed-effects, using 42 observations  
Iincluded 6 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 13 
Dependent variable: l_ARRESTS 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 27.5657 10.3820 2.655 0.0161 ** 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
1.24297 2.28586 0.5438 0.5933  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
2.88059e-05 4.38515e-05 0.6569 0.5196  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−1.44434e-05 2.76215e-05 −0.5229 0.6074  
dt_8 −3.29095 1.72056 −1.913 0.0718 * 
dt_9 −4.22021 1.46773 −2.875 0.0101 ** 
dt_10 −4.13705 1.51735 −2.726 0.0138 ** 
dt_11 −2.07282 1.39328 −1.488 0.1541  
dt_12 −2.05682 1.30196 −1.580 0.1316  
dt_13 −1.71060 1.31714 −1.299 0.2104  
dt_14 −2.39250 1.29195 −1.852 0.0805 * 
dt_15 −1.65013 1.10856 −1.489 0.1539  
dt_16 −0.600024 1.18033 −0.5084 0.6174  
dt_17 −0.144272 0.954775 −0.1511 0.8816  
dt_18 0.339773 0.894253 0.3800 0.7084  
CPI −0.0198198 0.0283046 −0.7002 0.4927  
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−6.69235 2.24657 −2.979 0.0080 *** 
dt_7 −4.03346 1.74036 −2.318 0.0324 ** 
AResidentialPropert
yPriceIn 
−0.00809203 0.0279530 −0.2895 0.7755  
 
Mean dependent var  2.126299  S.D. dependent var  1.258548 
Sum squared resid  11.51184  S.E. of regression  0.799717 
LSDV R-squared  0.822736  Within R-squared  0.663648 
LSDV F(23, 18)  3.632317  P-value(F)  0.003558 
Log-likelihood −32.41526  Akaike criterion  112.8305 
Schwarz criterion  154.5346  Hannan-Quinn  128.1167 
rho −0.531261  Durbin-Watson  2.306035 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(18, 18) = 1.97308 
 with p-value = P(F(18, 18) > 1.97308) = 0.0794742 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(5, 18) = 9.30255 
 with p-value = P(F(5, 18) > 9.30255) = 0.000163899 
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Table 13 : A.10 Model 3a 
Fixed-effects, using 42 observations  
Included 6 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 13 
Dependent variable: l_ARRESTS 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 29.8371 6.00062 4.972 0.0042 *** 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
1.21035 1.92852 0.6276 0.5578  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
2.74733e-05 1.87013e-05 1.469 0.2018  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−1.47112e-05 2.64455e-05 −0.5563 0.6020  
CPI −0.0208663 0.00918428 −2.272 0.0723 * 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−6.73109 2.23488 −3.012 0.0297 ** 
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
−0.594312 1.13196 −0.5250 0.6220  
dt_11 −2.02172 1.01417 −1.993 0.1028  
dt_12 −2.00018 1.28334 −1.559 0.1798  
dt_13 −1.65134 1.15187 −1.434 0.2111  
dt_14 −2.32140 1.06112 −2.188 0.0803 * 
dt_15 −1.59764 1.16651 −1.370 0.2291  
dt_16 −0.538511 1.23862 −0.4348 0.6819  
dt_17 −0.104844 0.867596 −0.1208 0.9085  
dt_18 0.365030 1.03946 0.3512 0.7398  
dt_7 −3.99293 1.12496 −3.549 0.0164 ** 
dt_8 −3.26495 1.39150 −2.346 0.0659 * 
dt_9 −4.20244 1.13398 −3.706 0.0139 ** 
dt_10 −4.07554 1.11696 −3.649 0.0148 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  2.126299  S.D. dependent var  1.258548 
Sum squared resid  11.53758  S.E. of regression  0.800610 
LSDV R-squared  0.822339  Within R-squared  0.662896 
Log-likelihood −32.46216  Akaike criterion  112.9243 
Schwarz criterion  154.6284  Hannan-Quinn  128.2105 
rho −0.538473  Durbin-Watson  2.321495 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(14, 5) = 3.4672 
 with p-value = P(F(14, 5) > 3.4672) = 0.0884187 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(5, 5.5) = 4.02888 
 with p-value = P(F(5, 5.5) > 4.02888) = 0.0667389 
 
Wald joint test on time dummies - 
 Null hypothesis: No time effects 
 Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(4) = 154.845 
 with p-value = 1.86348e-032 
 
 101 
 
Table 14 : A.11 Model 4 
Fixed-effects, using 37 observations  
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 6 
Dependent variable: CPI 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −37.0766 27.4550 −1.350 0.1999  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
16.1406 3.07636 5.247 0.0002 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
1.74023 0.597872 2.911 0.0122 ** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.661369 1.05808 −0.6251 0.5427  
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−15.4785 5.66575 −2.732 0.0171 ** 
dt_12 3.99605 2.07678 1.924 0.0765 * 
dt_14 0.962639 1.58749 0.6064 0.5547  
dt_15 0.0201143 1.40173 0.01435 0.9888  
dt_16 1.42121 1.24662 1.140 0.2748  
dt_17 0.405236 0.829131 0.4887 0.6332  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
−0.000109127 5.13418e-05 −2.126 0.0533 * 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−3.97041e-05 2.94760e-05 −1.347 0.2010  
GINIindex 1.42412 0.406863 3.500 0.0039 *** 
TaxBurden 0.188049 0.116798 1.610 0.1314  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
15.3338 4.47897 3.424 0.0045 *** 
AResidentialPropert
yPriceIn 
−0.0843724 0.0444054 −1.900 0.0798 * 
 
Mean dependent var  76.83784  S.D. dependent var  12.82254 
Sum squared resid  14.83293  S.E. of regression  1.068173 
LSDV R-squared  0.997494  Within R-squared  0.940806 
LSDV F(23, 13)  224.9828  P-value(F)  1.94e-13 
Log-likelihood −35.59046  Akaike criterion  119.1809 
Schwarz criterion  157.8430  Hannan-Quinn  132.8111 
rho −0.249451  Durbin-Watson  1.995790 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(15, 13) = 13.7746 
 with p-value = P(F(15, 13) > 13.7746) = 1.32297e-005 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 13) = 13.3161 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 13) > 13.3161) = 4.09619e-005  
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Table 15 : A.12 Model 4a 
Fixed-effects, using 37 observations  
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 6 
Dependent variable: CPI 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −37.0766 15.8419 −2.340 0.0474 ** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
16.1406 3.23854 4.984 0.0011 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
1.74023 0.571665 3.044 0.0160 ** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.661369 0.674736 −0.9802 0.3557  
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−15.4785 4.43693 −3.489 0.0082 *** 
dt_12 3.99605 1.58179 2.526 0.0355 ** 
dt_14 0.962639 0.768140 1.253 0.2455  
dt_15 0.0201143 0.590606 0.03406 0.9737  
dt_16 1.42121 0.935214 1.520 0.1671  
dt_17 0.405236 1.02501 0.3954 0.7029  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
−0.000109127 2.60966e-05 −4.182 0.0031 *** 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−3.97041e-05 2.60548e-05 −1.524 0.1660  
GINIindex 1.42412 0.562770 2.531 0.0352 ** 
TaxBurden 0.188049 0.0932857 2.016 0.0786 * 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
15.3338 3.46617 4.424 0.0022 *** 
AResidentialPropert
yPriceIn 
−0.0843724 0.0203216 −4.152 0.0032 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  76.83784  S.D. dependent var  12.82254 
Sum squared resid  14.83293  S.E. of regression  1.068173 
LSDV R-squared  0.997494  Within R-squared  0.940806 
Log-likelihood −35.59046  Akaike criterion  119.1809 
Schwarz criterion  157.8430  Hannan-Quinn  132.8111 
rho −0.249451  Durbin-Watson  1.995790 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(15, 8) = 75.4684 
 with p-value = P(F(15, 8) > 75.4684) = 6.19444e-007 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(8, 8.8) = 1.11757 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 8.8) > 1.11757) = 0.433781  
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Table 16 : A.13 Model 5 
Fixed-effects, using 33 observations  
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_Unlawfulactsinvolvingcontro 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 5.96156 1.67239 3.565 0.0051 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nlineat 
0.0691130 0.0393606 1.756 0.1096  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.177417 0.0730217 −2.430 0.0355 ** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−0.313527 0.387617 −0.8089 0.4374  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
0.508114 0.311772 1.630 0.1342  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
0.959044 0.368264 2.604 0.0263 ** 
CPI −0.00729626 0.00967623 −0.7540 0.4682  
goveff −0.342145 0.199745 −1.713 0.1175  
d_l_GDPpc −0.537602 1.34554 −0.3995 0.6979  
dt_12 0.0524103 0.106586 0.4917 0.6335  
dt_14 0.0271041 0.0691127 0.3922 0.7032  
dt_15 0.101266 0.0621295 1.630 0.1342  
dt_16 0.0594325 0.0506040 1.174 0.2674  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
5.02742e-06 3.17478e-06 1.584 0.1444  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−4.00275e-08 2.22547e-06 −0.01799 0.9860  
 
Mean dependent var  9.548329  S.D. dependent var  1.708291 
Sum squared resid  0.040945  S.E. of regression  0.063988 
LSDV R-squared  0.999562  Within R-squared  0.731527 
LSDV F(22, 10)  1036.244  P-value(F)  4.85e-14 
Log-likelihood  63.59367  Akaike criterion −81.18734 
Schwarz criterion −46.76766  Hannan-Quinn −69.60616 
rho −0.401888  Durbin-Watson  1.549720 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(14, 10) = 1.94626 
 with p-value = P(F(14, 10) > 1.94626) = 0.146462 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(8, 10) = 462.328 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 10) > 462.328) = 7.92857e-012 
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Table 17 : A.14 Model 5a 
Fixed-effects, using 33 observations  
Included 9 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: l_Unlawfulactsinvolvingcontro 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 5.96156 1.73434 3.437 0.0089 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nlineat 
0.0691130 0.0288005 2.400 0.0432 ** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.177417 0.0385109 −4.607 0.0017 *** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
−0.313527 0.237122 −1.322 0.2226  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
0.508114 0.236467 2.149 0.0639 * 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
0.959044 0.488349 1.964 0.0851 * 
CPI −0.00729626 0.0100314 −0.7273 0.4878  
goveff −0.342145 0.254309 −1.345 0.2154  
d_l_GDPpc −0.537602 1.41065 −0.3811 0.7130  
dt_12 0.0524103 0.0948941 0.5523 0.5958  
dt_14 0.0271041 0.0544394 0.4979 0.6320  
dt_15 0.101266 0.0509535 1.987 0.0821 * 
dt_16 0.0594325 0.0504046 1.179 0.2722  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
5.02742e-06 1.36642e-06 3.679 0.0062 *** 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
−4.00275e-08 1.80748e-06 −0.02215 0.9829  
 
Mean dependent var  9.548329  S.D. dependent var  1.708291 
Sum squared resid  0.040945  S.E. of regression  0.063988 
LSDV R-squared  0.999562  Within R-squared  0.731527 
Log-likelihood  63.59367  Akaike criterion −81.18734 
Schwarz criterion −46.76766  Hannan-Quinn −69.60616 
rho −0.401888  Durbin-Watson  1.549720 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(14, 8) = 9.84986 
 with p-value = P(F(14, 8) > 9.84986) = 0.00145235 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(8, 8.3) = 1.61069 
 with p-value = P(F(8, 8.3) > 1.61069) = 0.254485 
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Table 18 : A.15 Model 6 CHECK  
Fixed-effects, using 19 observations  
Included 6 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 4 
Dependent variable: l_MLRate 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −311.606 97.3896 −3.200 0.0854 * 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
58.1964 18.1951 3.198 0.0854 * 
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
−14.1944 5.93251 −2.393 0.1391  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
1.53504 1.18384 1.297 0.3242  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
1.21314 0.679521 1.785 0.2161  
dt_14 1.14863 1.56911 0.7320 0.5403  
dt_15 1.55028 1.35215 1.147 0.3702  
dt_16 2.43076 0.968046 2.511 0.1287  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
0.00114774 0.000290074 3.957 0.0583 * 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
0.000248853 5.49672e-05 4.527 0.0455 ** 
GINIindex −0.0399507 0.528334 −0.07562 0.9466  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
26.0845 12.5827 2.073 0.1739  
 
Mean dependent var  2.181806  S.D. dependent var  1.727134 
Sum squared resid  0.977061  S.E. of regression  0.698950 
LSDV R-squared  0.981803  Within R-squared  0.951336 
LSDV F(16, 2)  6.744302  P-value(F)  0.136634 
Log-likelihood  1.232793  Akaike criterion  31.53441 
Schwarz criterion  47.58988  Hannan-Quinn  34.25164 
rho −0.534871  Durbin-Watson  1.702062 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(11, 2) = 3.5544 
 with p-value = P(F(11, 2) > 3.5544) = 0.239958 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(5, 2) = 5.49137 
 with p-value = P(F(5, 2) > 5.49137) = 0.161195 
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Table 19 : A.16 Model 6 CHECKb 
Fixed-effects, using 19 observations  
Included 6 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 4 
Dependent variable: l_MLRate 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −311.606 52.0970 −5.981 0.0019 *** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
58.1964 13.6540 4.262 0.0080 *** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte/E-comm 
−14.1944 3.48909 −4.068 0.0097 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
1.53504 0.686691 2.235 0.0756 * 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/RE 
1.21314 0.629372 1.928 0.1118  
dt_14 1.14863 0.638196 1.800 0.1318  
dt_15 1.55028 0.783986 1.977 0.1049  
dt_16 2.43076 0.418528 5.808 0.0021 *** 
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
0.00114774 0.000129805 8.842 0.0003 *** 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
0.000248853 2.61348e-05 9.522 0.0002 *** 
GINIindex −0.0399507 0.431784 −0.09252 0.9299  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
26.0845 5.87837 4.437 0.0068 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  2.181806  S.D. dependent var  1.727134 
Sum squared resid  0.977061  S.E. of regression  0.698950 
LSDV R-squared  0.981803  Within R-squared  0.951336 
Log-likelihood  1.232793  Akaike criterion  31.53441 
Schwarz criterion  47.58988  Hannan-Quinn  34.25164 
rho −0.534871  Durbin-Watson  1.702062 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(11, 5) = 28.4453 
 with p-value = P(F(11, 5) > 28.4453) = 0.000854401 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(5, 4.0) = 0.193588 
 with p-value = P(F(5, 4.0) > 0.193588) = 0.949392 
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Table 20 : A.17 Model 7 
Fixed-effects, using 31 observations 
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: d_l_GDPpc 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −3.14230 0.891455 −3.525 0.0097 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.0290929 0.0107375 −2.709 0.0302 ** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
0.158902 0.0503186 3.158 0.0160 ** 
l_DRUGS 
 
0.175867 0.0674001 2.609 0.0349 ** 
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
0.127887 0.0607587 2.105 0.0733 * 
CPIXgrowthnumbca
rd 
−2.65940e-07 7.14013e-08 −3.725 0.0074 *** 
goveffXATM −0.000938738 0.000325152 −2.887 0.0234 ** 
l_refXatm −0.0751725 0.0384321 −1.956 0.0914 * 
dt_12 0.137288 0.0391693 3.505 0.0099 *** 
dt_14 0.0520300 0.0236758 2.198 0.0640 * 
dt_15 0.0261947 0.0171718 1.525 0.1710  
dt_16 0.0286077 0.0123169 2.323 0.0532 * 
goveffXecomm 0.000888096 0.000658949 1.348 0.2197  
l_EcommXref 0.0906328 0.0412791 2.196 0.0641 * 
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
1.95465e-05 5.56536e-06 3.512 0.0098 *** 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
9.61206e-07 3.98725e-07 2.411 0.0467 ** 
TaxBurden 0.00413193 0.00135206 3.056 0.0184 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.012649  S.D. dependent var  0.020750 
Sum squared resid  0.000474  S.E. of regression  0.008226 
LSDV R-squared  0.963329  Within R-squared  0.925237 
LSDV F(23, 7)  7.995149  P-value(F)  0.004399 
Log-likelihood  127.8916  Akaike criterion −207.7831 
Schwarz criterion −173.3674  Hannan-Quinn −196.5645 
rho −0.299432  Durbin-Watson  1.672684 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(16, 7) = 5.41435 
 with p-value = P(F(16, 7) > 5.41435) = 0.0153133 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(7, 7) = 2.89818 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 7) > 2.89818) = 0.0918564 
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Table 21 : A.18 Model 7a 
Fixed-effects, using 31 observations  
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: d_l_GDPpc 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −3.14230 0.793504 −3.960 0.0055 *** 
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline/Constr 
−0.0290929 0.00726334 −4.005 0.0052 *** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merce/E-bank 
0.158902 0.0458535 3.465 0.0105 ** 
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
0.175867 0.0417660 4.211 0.0040 *** 
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
0.127887 0.0420499 3.041 0.0188 ** 
CPIXgrowthnumbca
rd 
−2.65940e-07 5.19980e-08 −5.114 0.0014 *** 
goveffXATM −0.000938738 0.000154874 −6.061 0.0005 *** 
l_refXatm −0.0751725 0.0211998 −3.546 0.0094 *** 
dt_12 0.137288 0.0339460 4.044 0.0049 *** 
dt_14 0.0520300 0.0227520 2.287 0.0561 * 
dt_15 0.0261947 0.0168061 1.559 0.1630  
dt_16 0.0286077 0.0114266 2.504 0.0408 ** 
goveffXecomm 0.000888096 0.000646606 1.373 0.2120  
l_EcommXref 0.0906328 0.0247851 3.657 0.0081 *** 
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
1.95465e-05 3.86597e-06 5.056 0.0015 *** 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
9.61206e-07 3.96667e-07 2.423 0.0459 ** 
TaxBurden 0.00413193 0.00127002 3.253 0.0140 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.012649  S.D. dependent var  0.020750 
Sum squared resid  0.000474  S.E. of regression  0.008226 
LSDV R-squared  0.963329  Within R-squared  0.925237 
Log-likelihood  127.8916  Akaike criterion −207.7831 
Schwarz criterion −173.3674  Hannan-Quinn −196.5645 
rho −0.299432  Durbin-Watson  1.672684 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(16, 7) = 2.76755 
 with p-value = P(F(16, 7) > 2.76755) = 0.0883464 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(7, 7.6) = 0.0320106 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 7.6) > 0.0320106) = 0.999913 
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Table 22 : A.19 Model 8 
Fixed-effects, using 31 observations  
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: d_l_GDPpc 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −3.05935 1.03782 −2.948 0.0320 ** 
dt_12 0.159650 0.0437208 3.652 0.0147 ** 
dt_14 0.0608697 0.0263885 2.307 0.0692 * 
dt_15 0.0181315 0.0197244 0.9192 0.4001  
dt_16 0.0320676 0.0137230 2.337 0.0666 * 
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
0.138719 0.0661095 2.098 0.0899 * 
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
0.133324 0.0804761 1.657 0.1585  
TaxBurden 0.00420586 0.00150610 2.793 0.0383 ** 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−0.0364058 0.0877288 −0.4150 0.6954  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
1.16836e-05 7.13384e-06 1.638 0.1624  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
3.20961e-07 5.66733e-07 0.5663 0.5956  
atmtogoveff −0.0410043 0.0283231 −1.448 0.2074  
CPIXgrowthnumbca
rd 
−1.74839e-07 8.78570e-08 −1.990 0.1032  
l_refXatm 0.00393868 0.00693205 0.5682 0.5945  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nlineConstr 
−0.0342619 0.0122090 −2.806 0.0377 ** 
EcommDrug 0.0235174 0.0129106 1.822 0.1282  
ecomtogoveff 0.0119163 0.0397100 0.3001 0.7762  
l_ecommxl_ref −0.00251496 0.00676885 −0.3715 0.7255  
l_E-commerce 0.0955564 0.0594592 1.607 0.1689  
 
Mean dependent var  0.012649  S.D. dependent var  0.020750 
Sum squared resid  0.000353  S.E. of regression  0.008398 
LSDV R-squared  0.972698  Within R-squared  0.944337 
LSDV F(25, 5)  7.125433  P-value(F)  0.018866 
Log-likelihood  132.4642  Akaike criterion −212.9285 
Schwarz criterion −175.6448  Hannan-Quinn −200.7749 
rho −0.423441  Durbin-Watson  1.798387 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(18, 5) = 4.71261 
 with p-value = P(F(18, 5) > 4.71261) = 0.0471263 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(7, 5) = 2.49851 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 5) > 2.49851) = 0.165323 
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Table 23 : A.20 Model 8a 
Fixed-effects, using 31 observations  
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: d_l_GDPpc 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −3.05935 0.592830 −5.161 0.0013 *** 
dt_12 0.159650 0.0274051 5.826 0.0006 *** 
dt_14 0.0608697 0.0124926 4.872 0.0018 *** 
dt_15 0.0181315 0.0125803 1.441 0.1927  
dt_16 0.0320676 0.00848264 3.780 0.0069 *** 
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
0.138719 0.0439885 3.154 0.0161 ** 
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
0.133324 0.0346650 3.846 0.0063 *** 
TaxBurden 0.00420586 0.000862911 4.874 0.0018 *** 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−0.0364058 0.0360024 −1.011 0.3456  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
1.16836e-05 5.51264e-06 2.119 0.0718 * 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
3.20961e-07 4.59464e-07 0.6986 0.5074  
atmtogoveff −0.0410043 0.0152970 −2.681 0.0315 ** 
CPIXgrowthnumbca
rd 
−1.74839e-07 7.21759e-08 −2.422 0.0459 ** 
l_refXatm 0.00393868 0.00407958 0.9655 0.3665  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline1 
−0.0342619 0.00820267 −4.177 0.0042 *** 
EcommDrug 0.0235174 0.00660503 3.561 0.0092 *** 
ecomtogoveff 0.0119163 0.0269503 0.4422 0.6717  
l_ecommxl_ref −0.00251496 0.00435290 −0.5778 0.5815  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinter 
0.0955564 0.0322138 2.966 0.0209 ** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.012649  S.D. dependent var  0.020750 
Sum squared resid  0.000353  S.E. of regression  0.008398 
LSDV R-squared  0.972698  Within R-squared  0.944337 
Log-likelihood  132.4642  Akaike criterion −212.9285 
Schwarz criterion −175.6448  Hannan-Quinn −200.7749 
rho −0.423441  Durbin-Watson  1.798387 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(18, 7) = 3.831 
 with p-value = P(F(18, 7) > 3.831) = 0.0385811 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(7, 7.1) = 0.325177 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 7.1) > 0.325177) = 0.919652 
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Table 24 : A.21 Model 8b 
Fixed-effects, using 31 observations  
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: d_l_GDPpc 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −3.29035 1.39431 −2.360 0.0648 * 
dt_12 0.153659 0.0495694 3.100 0.0269 ** 
dt_14 0.0621962 0.0309415 2.010 0.1006  
dt_15 0.0263864 0.0227298 1.161 0.2981  
dt_16 0.0328963 0.0163427 2.013 0.1003  
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
0.164773 0.0940068 1.753 0.1400  
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
0.182553 0.0914151 1.997 0.1023  
TaxBurden 0.00307829 0.00155312 1.982 0.1043  
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−0.0349321 0.102066 −0.3423 0.7461  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
1.53548e-05 8.07128e-06 1.902 0.1155  
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
6.52256e-07 6.91288e-07 0.9435 0.3887  
atmtogoveff −0.0470464 0.0393175 −1.197 0.2851  
CPIXgrowthnumbca
rd 
−2.19388e-07 1.00964e-07 −2.173 0.0818 * 
l_refXatm 0.00184446 0.00233539 0.7898 0.4654  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline1 
−0.0268678 0.0135268 −1.986 0.1037  
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte1 
0.152031 0.0733288 2.073 0.0929 * 
Ebankdrug 0.00996376 0.00778637 1.280 0.2568  
ebanktocpi 0.000169471 0.000457180 0.3707 0.7261  
ebanktogoveff 0.0236712 0.0476137 0.4972 0.6402  
 
Mean dependent var  0.012649  S.D. dependent var  0.020750 
Sum squared resid  0.000388  S.E. of regression  0.008806 
LSDV R-squared  0.969985  Within R-squared  0.938806 
LSDV F(25, 5)  6.463248  P-value(F)  0.023381 
Log-likelihood  130.9957  Akaike criterion −209.9914 
Schwarz criterion −172.7077  Hannan-Quinn −197.8378 
rho −0.575393  Durbin-Watson  2.218958 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(18, 5) = 4.26151 
 with p-value = P(F(18, 5) > 4.26151) = 0.0578391 
 
Test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: F(7, 5) = 2.00649 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 5) > 2.00649) = 0.230343 
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Table 25 : A.22 Model 8c 
Fixed-effects, using 31 observations  
Included 8 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length: minimum 2, maximum 5 
Dependent variable: d_l_GDPpc 
Robust (HAC) standard errors 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const −3.29035 0.903655 −3.641 0.0083 *** 
dt_12 0.153659 0.0367149 4.185 0.0041 *** 
dt_14 0.0621962 0.0217187 2.864 0.0242 ** 
dt_15 0.0263864 0.0164596 1.603 0.1529  
dt_16 0.0328963 0.0111488 2.951 0.0214 ** 
l_Unlawfulactsinvol
vingcontro 
0.164773 0.0690656 2.386 0.0485 ** 
l_AResidentialPrope
rtyPriceIn 
0.182553 0.0508442 3.590 0.0089 *** 
TaxBurden 0.00307829 0.00133592 2.304 0.0546 * 
l_Automatedtellerma
chinesATMs 
−0.0349321 0.0287848 −1.214 0.2643  
growthrateinnumber
ofcardp 
1.53548e-05 7.31822e-06 2.098 0.0741 * 
Growthrateinnumber
ofcredit 
6.52256e-07 5.15070e-07 1.266 0.2459  
atmtogoveff −0.0470464 0.00871076 −5.401 0.0010 *** 
CPIXgrowthnumbca
rd 
−2.19388e-07 8.87029e-08 −2.473 0.0426 ** 
l_refXatm 0.00184446 0.00181221 1.018 0.3427  
l_Enterprisessellingo
nline1 
−0.0268678 0.0100610 −2.671 0.0320 ** 
l_Ebankingandecom
merceinte1 
0.152031 0.0390600 3.892 0.0060 *** 
Ebankdrug 0.00996376 0.00534523 1.864 0.1046  
ebanktocpi 0.000169471 0.000246270 0.6881 0.5135  
ebanktogoveff 0.0236712 0.0122627 1.930 0.0949 * 
 
Mean dependent var  0.012649  S.D. dependent var  0.020750 
Sum squared resid  0.000388  S.E. of regression  0.008806 
LSDV R-squared  0.969985  Within R-squared  0.938806 
Log-likelihood  130.9957  Akaike criterion −209.9914 
Schwarz criterion −172.7077  Hannan-Quinn −197.8378 
rho −0.575393  Durbin-Watson  2.218958 
 
Joint test on named regressors - 
 Test statistic: F(18, 7) = 7.83406 
 with p-value = P(F(18, 7) > 7.83406) = 0.00498401 
 
Robust test for differing group intercepts - 
 Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept 
 Test statistic: Welch F(7, 8.1) = 0.0307878 
 with p-value = P(F(7, 8.1) > 0.0307878) = 0.999927 
 
